OPERATIONAL NOTES
“The cockpit of the Hurricane looked to me at first sight as if someone had chucked a handful of the controls haphazardly into the bare metal interior of the cockpit and, by a bit of luck the throttle controls, for example, had landed on the left hand side where they were needed. But the weird gate arrangement for the undercarriage selector had landed low down on the right where the pilot would have to change hands on the control column, immediately he was airborne, to raise the undercarriage. There seemed to be no actual floor to the cockpit and the pilot’s seat appeared from above to be floating without apparent support in the middle of it. Inside the cockpit there was a never to be forgotten strong smell of glycol and oil from the Rolls Royce engine.”
One of the most comprehensive accounts of operating a Sea Hurricane from a flight deck comes from Commander 'Mike' Crosley in his book, "They Gave Me A Seafire":
My first take-off in a Hurricane was like a first ride on a high -powered speed boat, noisy, shaky and out of control and, with the same colossal acceleration which almost dragged my hand off the throttle and jerked my head back against the headrest, it was so unexpected. The aircraft took charge. It shook with power as the 900 horses, only a few feet in front, wrenched round the propeller and dug it into the air. It was frightening too, for the whole thing leapt into the sky well before I was ready for it and having used only a quarter of the runway.
The first landing was just as exciting, for none of us were used to an aircraft having such a high power/ weight ratio and which would respond so crisply to the smallest throttle adjustments or stick movements and forces on the approach. The view over the nose was excellent and allowed the runway to be seen straight ahead, even in the tail-down attitude. Sydney Camm had designed the Hurricane for use on grass airfields. It had fat, low-pressure tyres and a wide-track undercarriage, easy enough to cope with bumpy grass surfaces. The only problem with having to land on concrete runways was the rolling resistance which was far less than on soft grass surfaces. The aircraft had therefore to be pulled up entirely by the harsh use of the brakes, something for which they were not designed and in which they consistently overheated when the touchdown speeds were high.
If the direction of crosswind were from the port, or left side, this was very awkward in the Hurricane. It would often start to ‘weathercock’ uncontrollably. The pilot might then say, “Gawd, I’ve made a cock-up here!” and suddenly decide to go round again for another try. This could easily increase the swing tendency, for the propeller torque (rotation, being clockwise, from aft), would tend to stall the port wing and swing the tail further to port (due to the twist in the upper half of the propeller wash striking the fin) and the whole thing could end up like “a can of worms”.
Letter from Flag Officer Commanding, Force ‘H’ to Secretary of Admiralty
[ADM 199/ 847] 9 August 1941
Maintenance and operation of Sea Hurricanes
In view of the absence of spares for the Sea Hurricanes I did not feel justified in ordering their embarkation for operations SUBSTANCE and STYLE.
2. The presence of an unserviceable aircraft on the flying deck which cannot be struck below, which requires some considerable time to dismantle and which cannot be moved during the process of dismantling is obviously inacceptable [sic] during normal active operations.
3. Admittedly the performance of Sea Hurricanes above 12,000 feet is markedly superior to the Fulmar II and a squadron might be employed to advantage in a special operation in which the primary object is the destruction of enemy aircraft.
4. When however the tactical situation is such that the primary object is the defence of the Fleet and/ or convoy against air attack coupled with adequate air reconnaissance and the maintenance of an air striking force to deal with surface forces, the presence of Sea Hurricanes is an embarrassment.
5. Subject to the requisite spares being available there appears to be no reason why Sea Hurricanes should not be operated from Aircraft Carriers for the limited purpose set forth in paragraph 3.
Deck Landing
“There was no question of adopting the crabbed approach with the Sea Hurricane as was later to be developed for the Seafire to improve forward vision. The use of rudder on the approach in the Sea Hurricane produced a considerable increase in nose-heaviness which was quite unacceptable in this delicate situation, so it was a straight approach or nothing and the inadequate view forward simply had to be accepted. ”
The Hurricane had a reasonable view from the cockpit, except for dead ahead. It was just one of several characteristics which gave the Sea Hurricane less than optimal deck landing characteristics.
But the Hurricane had never been designed to operate from carriers. Given that consideration, it performed unusually well.
Stall speed was about 68 knots with some warning felt through fore-and-aft instability before a sharp wing drop. The all-down stall speed (with flaps and wheels deployed) was 57 knots.
Then there was the Hurricane’s awkward landing gear bounce. At least, as Captain Eric Brown notes, the Hurricane was a far more robust airframe than the Spitfire - allowing it to absorb considerably more deck-landing punishment.
Take-off was not too difficult. The torque swing could be contained by using the rudder until the aircraft lifted off at 70 knots.
Performance
The early Sea Hurricanes had the famous Merlin 2 or 3 engines, rated at 1030hp. These drove a three-bladed constant-speed propeller.
It would climb at 150kts at a rate of 2000ft per minute.
Nevertheless, the added weight of the hook, airframe strengthening, catapult spools and naval radios resulted in the Sea Hurricane having inferior performance to the stock RAF version.
An original FAA data card showing the performance of the Hawker Sea Hurricane 1B (Note the performance with 16lb boost at the bottom right of the card).
With a top speed of about 300mph, it was 30mph slower than the land-based version.
But this was not all that different to the best available carrier-based alternative: The Wildcat/Martlet. Both were rated as 280 knots in top speed as opposed to the 230kts of the Fulmar.
There is one successful field modification of the Sea Hurricane which has since passed into legend.
When a small force of four Sea Hurricanes were delivered to HMS Eagle in March 1942, an impromptu 'fix' boosted their engine performance significantly. The adjustments to the manifold pressure control allowed maximum ‘boost’ to increase from +6/6lbs to +16lbs. This resulted in a maximum speed of 315mph at 7500 – a full 25mph faster than an original specification Hurricane at that height. (The RAF Hurricane Ib data card can be found HERE).
Naturally there was a tradeoff: A considerable loss in engine life.
Endurance
The Sea Hurricane’s range was recorded as about 450 miles. But it was loiter time that meant the most for carrier operations.
Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.
The consequence of this was carriers being forced to turn into the wind far more often to take-off and land Sea Hurricanes. So they were often held as 'alert' aircraft on the deck while their longer-legged stablemates maintained the CAP.
COMBAT NOTES
“Hurricanes! Scramble the Hurricanes!” The fitters in the cockpits pressed the starter-buttons, and the four Merlins opened up with a blast of sound and a gust of blue smoke. As we scrambled up the wings, the crews hopped out the other side, fixing our straps with urgent fingers. Connect R.T.; switch on. Ten degrees of flap. Trim. Quick cockpit check. The ship was under full helm, racing up into wind— and we were off and climbing at full boost on a northerly vector to 20,000 feet, heads swivelling. Down to 12,000; alter course; climb to 20,000 again. And there they were, a big formation of 88’ s below us. One after another we peeled off and went down after them. They broke formation as they saw us coming, and Brian and I picked one and went after him. He turned and dived away, and we stuffed the nose down, full bore, willing our aircraft to make up on him. At extreme range we gave him a long burst; bits came off and smoke poured out of one engine, and then he vanished into the thickening twilight. We hadn’t a hope of catching him and making sure; already he had led us away from the convoy; and so, cursing our lack of speed, we re-formed, joined up with Steve and Paddy, the other members of the flight, and started to climb back to base.”
The Hurricane was an easy aircraft for aerobatics as its inherent manoeuvrability was supplemented by good control harmony. While the ailerons were light, the rudder could be heavy. All controls grew steadily heavier until tops peed was achieved – but remained effective.
The aircraft itself was highly stable about all three axes both in the climb and at cruise. When diving, though, the Hurricane's tail-heavyness could not be trimmed out as it would affect the aircraft’s ability to level out. The Hurricane’s split trailing-edge flaps were useful for added manoeuvrability at any speed as their angle would adjust to the airflow.
Mock dogfights between FAA pilots in different machines appear to have been commonplace. In the case of test pilot Capt Eric 'Winkle' Brown, it was one of his jobs:
I was to engage in many mock combats with RAF Hurricane and Spitfires and was soon convinced that the Martlet was a formidable fighting aircraft, capable of holding its own in every phase except that it was slower than its RAF opponents in the dive. However, this shortcoming was more than compensated for by its steep climb, excellent turning circule and completely innocuous stalling characteristics. The pilot had a better all-round view from the Martlet and, of course, there were those ‘fifty calibre machine guns which were to prove to be possibly the best fighter weapons of the war, although, admittedly, somewhat less reliable than the British 0.303in (7.7mm) gun in that they were more prone to seizing in low temperatures.
Letter from Vice Admiral, Naval Air Stations1 to Secretary of Admiralty
ADM 1/ 13522] 21 September 1941
Selection of Hurricanes for conversion to Sea Hurricanes
Be pleased to represent to Their Lordships that the Vice Admiral Naval Air Stations does not consider that the selection of Hurricanes for conversion to Sea Hurricanes has up to the present been altogether satisfactory.
2. Many of those selected have been of the L.P. and N. series, and most of these have had previous service in Royal Air Force Operational Squadrons. One particular case may be quoted; N. 2455 has since October 1939 been in two different Royal Air Force Squadrons, took part in the Battle of Britain, and was twice extensively damaged, once by forced landing and once by enemy action, before being converted to Sea Hurricane.
3. All these old aircraft suffer from a multitude of minor defects and the Stations have had to expend many weeks’ work in rendering them fit for allotment to a Squadron, and although after this work had been completed the aircraft can be considered as serviceable, it is thought from consideration of their age and previous history that it is most likely that they will continue to suffer from minor defects during their remaining life.
4. It is further considered that even if they can be maintained serviceable, the effect on morale of allotting aircraft of this type to a new Squadron forming is deplorable. Many of the Pilots joining will be young and enthusiastic officers, joining an Operational Squadron for the first time, and to be given an aircraft which can only be described as a ‘cast off from the Royal Air Force’ causes a considerable damping of their ardour.
5. It is submitted that in future only new Hurricanes or those with a minimum of flying hours should be selected for conversion to Sea Hurricanes.
ASSESSMENT
Fleet Air Arm test pilot Captain Eric Brown flew more World War II combat aircraft than any other. After the war he assembled his notes and experience to provide performance comparisons between many types in his book "Duels in the Sky". Here are the summaries relating to the Sea Hurricane:
Sea Hurricane I Versus Messerschmitt 109F
The Me109F had the edge over the Hurricane in every department except maneuverability, and therefore the initiative always lay with the German aircraft. However, if the latter decided to indulge in a dogfight, the Hurricane would meet in on mere equal terms. Any attempt by the Me109F to follow the Hurricane in steep turns and the 109F’s slats would snatch open, causing lateral twitching and ruining the pilot’s chances of accurately sighting his guns.
Verdict: A good Hurricane pilot could hold his own against the Me109F in a dogfight, but the initiative to mix it or break it off lay with the German. Therefore the odds favoured the 109F.
Sea Hurricane I Versus Messerschmitt 110C
For speed these two fighters were on a par at low level, but the Hurricane was much more manoeuvrable. Its best chance of success was a beam attack on the German aircraft, turning to quarter with the point of aim behind the pilot’s cockpit. An astern attack could be quite effective if made somewhat flat to limit the rear gunner’s field of fire. A head-on attack would be inadvisable because of the Me110C’s heavy nose armament. The twin’s best evasive tactic would be to use its superior acceleration in the dive.
Verdict: The Me 110C should not deliberately mix it with the Hurricane; the latter was a splendid dogfighter, which the twin fighter certainly was not.
Sea Hurricane I versus Junkers 88A-4
Here the situation was similar to the previous one (versus Me110C), except that the Ju88A-4 was better armed for rear defence. Consequently a head-on or beam attack would be the best tactic for the Hurricane. With almost the manoeuvrability of a fighter, the Ju88A-4 could make things difficult for the Hurricane, but the outcome was weighted in the latter’s favour, provided it kept out of the astern cone of the bomber’s fire.
Verdict: The Hurricane had a good edge over the Ju88A-4, but not as much as it had over the Me110C
Sea Hurricane I versus Heinkel 111H-6
The Hurricane performed significantly better than the bomber. Moreover, the fighter’s excellent manoeuvrability would allow it to pick its spot much as it chose. The He111H-6 was very vulnerable during its torpedo-drop run in, when its speed was restricted and its lower guns could not be brought to bear on the Hurricane.
Verdict: The he111H-6 had little chance of winning a contest with the Hurricane, and virtually none at all if caught in a torpedo attack.
Sea Hurricane I versus Kurier (Condor)
The Kurier was a formidable opponent on account of its heavy armament, but it had an Achilles heel – a weak spine. The eight guns of the Hurricane could hammer that soft spot in a beam attack. On the other hand, there were no blind spots in the defensive armament of the Kurier, so an attack was high risk.
Verdict: The odds in such a combat favoured the manoeuvrable Hurricane, but not so heavily that it was not at severe risk against the Kurier’s flying arsenal.
Sea Hurricane Versus Macchi C202
The Italian fighter possessed a speed advantage, but it was not critical, especially as the British fighter was more manoeuvrable and had the heavier firepower. A dogfight would slightly favour the Hurricane.
Verdict: This would be a finely balanced affair, the outcome depending primarily on pilot skill.
Sea Hurricane Versus Reggiane 2001
The Re2001 resembled the Hurricane but it had a significant speed advantage and was equally maneuverable. It lacked the firepower of the British fighter. Overall, the Italian aircraft was better endowed.
Verdict: With its performance superiority, the Re2001 should be able to assert its will in this encounter.
Sea Hurricane IIC Versus Zeke 22
The Japanese fighter was superior in performance, particularly climbing and a turning circle but the Hurricane, with its better rate of roll and dive acceleration, would still be difficult to bring down. If the British fighter drew a bead on the Zeke – a large if – that would guarantee its powerful four-cannon armament an instant kill.
Verdict: This would be a contest of well-matched opponents, but the Zeke’s remarkable agility should ultimately prove lethal.
VARIANTS
“The Hurricane was splendid, very strong and steady, with a clean, purposeful line to it and no vices except a tendency to drop a wing on the stall. Its reputation stood high, and it was the best fighter the fleet possessed. Needless to say, the fleet did not possess very many of them (as the wings didn’t fold, none of the Illustrious class of carrier could accomodate them), and in any case, by the summer of 1941, the Mark I was already obsolescent.”
SEA HURRICANE IA – THE HURRICAT ‘CATAFIGHTER’
By the end of January, 1941, Hawker had an order for 50 field-modification kits to enable surplus RAF Hurricanes to be sent to sea as single-shot air defence system fitted to key merchant ships. The hapless pilots had to ditch alongside their mothership.
Some 35 merchant ships – designated Catapult Armed Merchantmen (CAM ships) - were rapidly fitted with the crane, catapult and between one and three Hurricanes. Five Royal Navy Auxiliary vessels were likewise equipped (and designated Fighter Catapult Ships).
The aircraft themselves were very tired discarded RAF machines, flown by RAF pilots and maintained by RAF mechanics.
The first ‘Hurricat’ launch in anger was on June 18, 1941, when the FCS HMS Maplin launched her aircraft against a German shadower. The Fw200 Condor was shot down.
The‘Hurricats’ was soon given a 44 gallon overload tank to give the pilots the opportunity to return to land after launch – a vital boost to morale given the aircraft’s horrific ditching record. The slding cockpit hood was also modified to make it easier to jettision, and an inflatable dinghy fitted.
Eventually, 250 Hurricanes were modified for the catapults.
SEA HURRICANE IB – THE HOOKED HURRICANE
“The Hurricane Mark IB had been through the Battle of Britain and was, therefore, a highly developed machine. Everything in it was made as easy as possible for the pilot so that he could concentrate on finding, fixing and killing his opponent. It had automatic boost control and mixture control, a fully constant-speed propeller and, best of all, a modern blind-flying instrument panel with an artificial horizon and a ‘geared’ altimeter. (The altimeter had two hands, the ‘minute’ hand going round once for each 1000 feet.) The only control the pilot had to make a conscious effort to remember — besides the radiator flap — was to change-over the fuel cock from the small ‘gravity’ feed tank of 15 gallons, to the main tank. This had to be done after take-off otherwise the engine would stop 20 minutes later. ”
Letter from Vice Admiral, Naval Air Stations to Secretary of Admiralty [ADM 1/ 13522] 21 September 1941
Selection of Hurricanes for conversion to
Sea Hurricanes
Be pleased to represent to Their Lordships that the Vice Admiral Naval Air Stations does not consider that the selection of Hurricanes for conversion to Sea Hurricanes has up to the present been altogether satisfactory.
2. Many of those selected have been of the L.P. and N. series, and most of these have had previous service in Royal Air Force Operational Squadrons. One particular case may be quoted; N. 2455 has since October 1939 been in two different Royal Air Force Squadrons, took part in the Battle of Britain, and was twice extensively damaged, once by forced landing and once by enemy action, before being converted to Sea Hurricane.
3. All these old aircraft suffer from a multitude of minor defects and the Stations have had to expend many weeks’ work in rendering them fit for allotment to a Squadron, and although after this work had been completed the aircraft can be considered as serviceable, it is thought from consideration of their age and previous history that it is most likely that they will continue to suffer from minor defects during their remaining life.
4. It is further considered that even if they can be maintained serviceable, the effect on morale of allotting aircraft of this type to a new Squadron forming is deplorable. Many of the Pilots joining will be young and enthusiastic officers, joining an Operational Squadron for the first time, and to be given an aircraft which can only be described as a ‘cast off from the Royal Air Force’ causes a considerable damping of their ardour.
5. It is submitted that in future only new Hurricanes or those with a minimum of flying hours should be selected for conversion to Sea Hurricanes.
Minute from Prime Minister to Secretary of Chiefs of Staff Committee [ADM 116/ 5348] 30 September 1941
Fighters for aircraft carriers
When I visited INDOMITABLE last week, I was astonished to learn that the handful of Hurricanes to be allotted to this vital war unit were only of the lower type Hurricane Ones. I trust it may be arranged that only the finest aeroplanes that can do the work go into all aircraft-carriers. All this year it has been apparent that the power to launch the highest class fighters from aircraft-carriers may reopen to the Fleet great strategic doors which have been closed against them. The aircraft-carrier should have supreme priority in the quality and character of suitable types.
The Hurricane did need modification in order to sustain ongoing carrier operations.
So a handful of Hurricane Mk Is, mostly deemed surplus to RAF requirements, were reluctantly handed over for navalisation.
These were re-designated Hurricane Mk IBs to denote the fact they were carrier fighters, not CAM-ship aircraft.
An A-frame arrester hook was fitted to a test aircraft in March 1941 and delivered to the RAE at Farnborough for evaluation. It was to become the prototype for the IB.
The arrester hook was given a retaining spring to absorb some of the shock from grabbing a wire, as well as preventing the hook from bouncing up and damaging the fuselage. A green light in the cockpit would notify the pilot the hook was down and a carrier landing was possible.
Some strengthening of the airframe was also found to be necessary to cope with the deceleration forces experienced when landing aboard a carrier.
The provision of a folding wing was examined in 1940. But the desperate need for aircraft designers for next-generation aircraft, as well as concerns over the Hurricane’s ability to accommodate the extra weight, soon saw this idea abandoned.
This had immediate and significant consequences. Only the older carriers such as HMS Eagle and HMS Furious could stow the unfolded Sea Hurricane below deck. HMS Indomitable, with its large forward lift, would not be complete until 1941. HMS Illustrious, Formidable and Victorious would be limited to deck parks of only six or so machines.
This left the Sea Hurricanes exposed to the weather, slung out over the open sea on outrigger struts when aboard fleet carriers, or simply lashed to the decks of the early escort carriers.
But the inherent ruggedness of the Hawker design handled these conditions well. Serviceability – given the conditions – remained surprisingly high.
The first FAA squadron to receive the IB was 880 which would later be assigned to HMS Furious. The aircraft were delivered in January 1941, but only embarked for sea operations in July. A short time later, on July 21, the type scored its first victory: An 880 Squadron Sea Hurricane shot down a reconnaissance Do 18 flying boat off Norway.
By the end of 1941, some 100 Sea Hurricanes IBs equipped 801, 806 and 885 squadrons. These were serving on HMS Argus, Eagle, Formidable and Victorious.
Eventually 32 FAA squadrons were to be issued with the Sea Hurricane IB. It saw service in the Atlantic, the Russian Convoys and the Malta Convoys.
But it would be Operation Pedestal that would mark the type’s high point. Soon after the Mk IIC would begin to surplant it.
Many Mk IB’s would again be modified. They would be given four 20mm cannons and redesignated Mk ICs. These returned to operations early in 1942.
About 70 also had their engines upgraded with the XX-series Merlins. These were reclassified Mk IICs.
SEA HURRICANE IC
First deployed with 811 Squadron in January 1942, the IC was simply the grafting of the four-cannon Hurricane IIC's outer wings with a Merlin III engined Hurricane Mk I.
Naturally, the heavier guns compromised the fighter's speed. The MkIC would achieve 256kts at 15,000ft.
The most famous Sea Hurricane IC was, ‘Dickie’ Cork’s personal machine during Operation Pedestal. It was the only example of its type carried aboard HMS Indomitable at that time, and its 20mm armament gave Cork several kills.
Limited numbers of the IC were to see service aboard HMS Eagle (when she was sunk in Pedestal), Furious and Victorious.
The up-engined Sea Hurricane IIC would displace the type in late 1942.
SEA HURRICANE IIC
“Our new Hurricanes were armed with 12 x .303 inch Brownings or four 20 mm Hispano cannon. They had ex-bomber Mark XX Merlin engines, with a nominal 1460 hp take-off power. This was 300 more horsepower than the Mark IB Hurricane. The Mark II was also fitted with a new two speed super-charger. The two speed gear changed automatically at about 10,000 feet to higher gear whenever the maximum boost fell below about eight pounds per square inch. However, as the gearing took an extra two hundred horsepower out of the engine to drive the turbine — although the final power output was much greater than the Mark I Hurricane — it used fuel at a frightening rate. As the Pilot’s Notes of those days contained only the most rudimentary ‘do’s and don’ts’, many of us had to find these things out for ourselves.”
The RAF attempted to extend the functionality of its Hurricane force by giving it four 20mm cannon in the place of its earlier octet of .303mg. Unfortunately, the Hispano I and II cannons only came with 100 rounds per gun.
Later machines could also carry four 'zero-length' rockets, two under each wing.
Some 81 Hurricane IIC airframes, again originally intended for the RAF, were taken aside in May 1942 and fitted with the necessary arrester hooks and naval radios for carrier use.
The 1460hp Merlin XX was capable of pulling the Sea Hurricane along at 342mph at 22,000ft, or 322mph at 13,500ft. At economical settings, internal fuel could take it some 460 miles. With two external 44 Imp gal drop tanks, this extended to 908 miles.
Eventually some 18 FAA squadrons would operate the type. It was also the last Sea Hurricane in operational service aboard the escort carriers HMS Vindex and Nairana.
The high point of the IIC’s operations would be Operation Torch in November 1942. Some 40 Sea Hurricanes were embarked aboard the escort carriers HMS Avenger, Biter and Dasher. Avenger was torpedoed by U-155 on November 15. She sank rapidly, taking with her the entire complement of aircraft and most of her crew.
The last Sea Hurricane deliveries were made in August 1943, but the type was already being withdrawn from front-line squadrons. From this point the Sea Hurricanes would steadily be to be supplanted by the more efficient folding-wing Martlets (suddenly available as the USN restocked on Hellcats) and the new - but 'difficult' - Corsair made its first appearances.
The last unit operating the Sea Hurricane was 835 Squadron, which converted to Martlets in September 1944.
“Perhaps it is sufficient to say that, contrary to logic, it took to the naval environment remarkably well. A thoroughly competent Fleet fighter it was not and could never have been, but it was a great dogfighter with, in its cannon-armed versions, plenty of punch and, most important, it reached the Fleet Air Arm at a time when that service desperately needed a relatively fast and reasonably modern single-seat fighter embarked in its carriers.”
