Armoured Aircraft Carriers in World War II

USS Robin: It’s the US aircraft carrier that never was.

It’s also the closest the USN really got to the mythical “Project Rainbow”, where experimentation with teleportation was supposed to have made ships 'vanish into thin air' before reappearing somewhere else.

So, what’s in a name?

At first glance it seems to be what it claims. It was a ship under US command. Its aircraft bore the USN white star. Its crew wore USN clothing. Its radio operators spoke with US accents. Many of its aircrew also had those distinctive twangs.

But the name didn’t match that in the USN inventory: USS Robin was supposed to be a minesweeper / ocean-going tug.

This one was an aircraft carrier.

And the ship itself was flying the flag of the Royal Navy.

The cause was the battle of Santa Cruz Islands.

USS Hornet had been lost.  Enterprise had simply accumulated too much battle damage to be effective.

This left Saratoga. And her repairs were to keep her out of the front line until November 1942.

The effect was a US Pacific Fleet need for another carrier to appear, as if out of nowhere.

Eventually, this ‘miracle’ was to materialise in the form of USS Robin.

It’s one of World War II’s forgotten tales – when the United States asked Britain to help reinforce its diminished Pacific Fleet after the heavy losses of 1942.

What little reference is made to “USS Robin” is usually confused, incomplete – or simply a re-hashing of yet another poorly compiled summary.

As always, the story is much more mundane – and complex – than is generally understood.

Minute from First Sea Lord to Prime Minister
[PREM 3/ 163/ 1] 5 November 1942

Carrier reinforcements for South West Pacific Herewith are two preliminary investigations dealing with the possibility of reinforcing the S.W. Pacific after “Torch”, on the basis that we suffer no casualties to important units during that operation. The situation will be again reviewed when we know how “Torch” has fared.

Appreciation by Admiralty
[PREM 3/ 163/ 1]
Carrier reinforcements for South West Pacific

Carrier Reinforcement of S.W. Pacific
The attached appreciation shows that in naval forces the Americans will be inferior to the Japanese in the South West Pacific until next Spring, even if we reinforce them by three aircraft carriers. Without these reinforcements they will be markedly inferior, and the security of the trans-Pacific air and sea routes may be endangered. Even if Guadalcanal falls, provided we dispute further Japanese advances to the South and maintain pressure in New Guinea, the Japanese should be sufficiently contained in the Pacific to prevent them from carrying out any major operations elsewhere.

2. It must be emphasised that with the limited knowledge of the naval, air and land forces engaged in this theatre which is available in the Admiralty, this conclusion must necessarily be somewhat speculative. Moreover, in our calculations we have made allowance for U.S.S. RANGER reinforcing this area after “TORCH”, though the Americans do not apparently like exposing this ship to any severe test on account of her poor underwater protection.

The Indian Ocean
3. Activity in the South West Pacific, combined with the general shortage of shipping will, in our opinion, limit Japanese activity in the Indian Ocean to naval sorties and carrier-borne raids against shipping or harbours. There are two methods of countering this:–
(a) By superior naval forces based in Ceylon and
(b) By shore-based air forces, adequate to cover coastal shipping, ports and anchorages.
In addition naval escort against raiders will be required for important convoys outside the protection of shore-based air.
4. Owing to our shortage of aircraft carriers and destroyers, we are unlikely to be able to provide in the first half of 1943 an Eastern Fleet superior to the naval force which the Japanese could make available were they to accept risks in the Pacific area. Since the weaker Fleet is unable to provide protection, our proper course is to rely on anti-raider escort by cruisers, backed up by flying boat and shore-based reconnaissance and air striking forces. In accepting this course, we necessarily accept diversion or stoppage of trade during the period of any Japanese sortie in strength. This, however, should not be of very long duration in view of their inability to seize advance bases while contained in the South Pacific.
5. It therefore follows that by reinforcing the South Pacific with major units of the Eastern Fleet and so increasing the scale of attack which the Japanese must bring to bear concurrently with the threat which the Allied forces can mount, we should be able to do more to increase the security of the Indian Ocean than by retaining in this area a weak Eastern Fleet. Of such action, the build-up of flying boat and shore-based air forces in the Indian Ocean is a corollary.

The Atlantic Ocean
6. With the GRAF ZEPPELIN possibly in service by early 1943, two large Fleet Carriers must be retained in the United Kingdom or at Gibraltar to allow for docking and repairs.
If all other Fleet Carriers were to be detached to the South Pacific, the chances of giving increased protection to Russian convoys by the Home Fleet would be lessened, since the risks involved would be greater. Supplies to Russia by the Northern route may even increase in importance next year. Even if German air strength in Northern Norway deteriorates therefore, we are unlikely to be able to exploit it by providing adequate air protection for the Home Fleet east of Bear Island.

The Mediterranean
7. The Chiefs of Staffs have decided that our main amphibious operations in 1943 should be conducted in the Mediterranean with the object of stretching the enemy forces to the greatest possible extent. They have also recommended that in this theatre we should first aim at:–
(i) The elimination of Axis forces in North Africa from the East, together with such assistance as can be rendered from the West.
(ii) The capture of Sardinia from the West at the earliest opportunity. Given adequate shore-based air forces on the North African coast at either end, cover of convoys to support the elimination of Axis forces in Libya should not require the presence of capital ships or carriers.
8. Investigations into the capture of Sardinia have, at present followed two lines:–
(a) capture by direct assault of Cagliari and (b) the capture of Cagliari by overland advance from the West coast.
Owing to lack of intelligence no decision has yet been possible as to whether a direct assault on Cagliari is feasible but, if it is, we could establish our fighter forces ashore very much more quickly by this means. Air support for the assault could probably be provided from Tunisia by long range fighters amplified by fighters from Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers. To interfere with a direct assault on Cagliari, the Italian Fleet must accept the threat of heavy air attack from Tunisia. Were this threat adequate, no heavy Naval covering force and therefore no Fleet carriers would be necessary against the Italian Fleet.
|The alternative plan involves carrier borne air support for several days until the Army has captured Cagliari and its aerodromes. To cover this West coast landing, a force of 3 battleships and 2 carriers would probably be necessary to guard against interference by the Italian Fleet from the North. This alternative plan is probably not feasible unless the enemy fails to reinforce his land garrison and the strength of the German Air Force in the Mediterranean is much reduced.
9. For offensive naval action against the French or Italian Rivieras, the support of Fleet Aircraft Carriers would be required. Similarly, for any operation against Sicily, Fleet Aircraft Carriers would be needed to support heavy naval covering forces.
10. To sum up, if no Fleet Carriers can be made available for the Mediterranean the capture of Sicily is probably not possible. The capture of Sardinia might, however, be possible if a direct assault can be made on Cagliari. In this event we must, therefore, forego any hope of reopening the Mediterranean to a full flow of traffic. By denying ourselves offensive Naval sorties such as the bombardment of Genoa, we also curtail our ability to increase the liability of Italy to Germany.

Summary of the Problem
11. Our broad strategy is to defeat Germany, diverting from that object only the minimum forces necessary for the safeguarding of our interests in the East. The problem before us, therefore, lies in the interpretation of the word “minimum”. On the one hand, without British support, the American trans-Pacific trans-Pacific air and sea routes may be endangered by the Japanese; on the other hand, with only two large carriers in the North Atlantic, we are unable to exploit our Mediterranean strategy to the full and cannot hope fully to reopen that area to our shipping.
12. We must avoid dividing our carrier forces into small groups. If we are to reinforce the Americans we must do so on as large a scale as possible, not only because any compromise will fail to achieve our object of containing the Japanese in this area, but also because weak reinforcements will subject us to greater risks of attrition.
13. We shall get no new Fleet carriers until 1944, when INDEFATIGABLE and IMPLACABLE come into service. By mid-1944 the Americans expect to complete eleven Fleet carriers and nine converted cruiser carriers additional to their present forces.
14. Unless we support the Americans to the utmost of our ability in the present emergency, we are unlikely to gain naval support for European operations – possibly in the Mediterranean – in the latter half of 1943 when the South Pacific situation should have been retrieved.
15. From the foregoing arguments and, of course, subject to any casualties sustained in “TORCH” and a satisfactory solution to the problem of the French Fleet, I recommend that we should reinforce the American naval forces in the South Pacific at the expense of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean during the next six months.

Conclusion
16. This appreciation only deals with the question of Carriers. A separate paper on the Battleship problem is attached.

DARKEST HOUR

An initial appeal for carrier assistance by the USN shortly after the Battle of Midway was to be declined by the Royal Navy: The struggle in the Mediterranean had reached fever-pitch.

The US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King was particularly bitter about Britain's reluctance to commit heavy forces to the Pacific or Bay of Bengal. But he appears not to have been aware of how over-extended the Royal Navy was at this time.

Britain needed what few fully operational carriers she had to force the German-Italian blockade in the Arctic, North Sea, Bay of Biscay and Mediterranean. Then there was the need to discourage German and Japanese raiders among the supply lines of the Indian Ocean.

Operation Pedestal, in August 1942, had been a qualified success. It revealed the power of a few well-coordinated fighters in the face of overwhelming enemy opposition. But HMS Indomitable was bombed, putting this valuable carrier out of action for six crucial months. Then HMS Victorious joined Formidable and escort carriers led by Furious for the invasion of North Africa, at Algiers.

Message from Prime Minister
to President of United States of America
[PREM 3/ 163/ 1] 2 December 1942
Carrier reinforcements for South West Pacific

1. Ever since we received you request for carrier reinforcement for your Pacific Fleet we have been earnestly seeking to meet your wishes. We did not feel able to come to a decision about these very few vital units until we knew how our carriers had fared in the restricted and dangerous waters in which they had to operate for TORCH.
2. The hazards of TORCH are not yet ended, as our build-up of shore-based aircraft will not enable the withdrawal for some time of the two carriers now employed on TORCH.
Knowing, however, how urgently you require a reinforcement of carriers in the Pacific we are prepared to take a risk now and come to a decision as to what assistance we can give you.
3. As you are aware, our carrier strength consists of the following:–
(a) Four long endurance Armoured Fleet Carriers:–
VICTORIOUS – Efficient and just withdrawn from TORCH.
ILLUSTRIOUS – Efficient and the only carrier now with the Eastern Fleet.
INDOMITABLE – Undergoing after action repairs, and will not be worked up before February.
FORMIDABLE – Now employed on TORCH but has turbine trouble and must go into dockyard hands for 6 or 7 weeks as soon as possible.
(b) One short endurance Fleet Carrier, FURIOUS, which is now employed on TORCH.
(c) An aircraft repair ship, UNICORN, which can operate about 25 aircraft, but will not be ready for service until early February.
4. In the hope that your operations in the South Pacific will prevent the Japanese from making serious raids into the Indian Ocean we are prepared to take the serious risk of withdrawing ILLUSTRIOUS from the Eastern Fleet, and give Admiral Somerville the UNICORN and an auxiliary carrier. We are also prepared to withdraw VICTORIOUS from the Home Fleet, and to send you both VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS if you can allow RANGER to join the Home Fleet.
In view of the vital importance of the Atlantic communication, the necessity of supporting the North Russian convoys, the possible appearance of GRAF ZEPPELIN at the end of the year, and the present condition of INDOMITABLE and FORMIDABLE, we could not release both VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS without the addition of RANGER to the Home Fleet.
6. I am much in favour of sending you two carriers rather than one if this can be managed, as this will not only give you increased strength but would allow the two ships to work as a tactical unit, which would appear to be necessary as neither ship carries sufficient aircraft to operate singly.
I would propose to send Admiral Lyster, 1 who is known to a good many of your officers, in command.
7. It is considered necessary for both ships to proceed to Pearl Harbor, where they should arrive about the end of December, to adjust their complement of aircraft.
8. If you are in favour of this exchange Pound will settle details with King.

With only HMS Victorious in the Home Fleet, HMS Formidable in the Mediterranean Fleet and Illustrious in the Eastern Fleet - the RN did not have carriers to spare.

Nevertheless, when Admiral King, repeated his request for aircraft carriers to be diverted to bolster the Pacific Fleet after the unexpectedly high cost of the Guadalcanal campaign, the Admiralty acquiesced.

We are far more heavily engaged in the Southwest Pacific than I anticipated a few months ago, Roosevelt reportedly told Churchill.

It was not entirely a benevolent act: The Royal Navy knew the type of warfare being fought in the Pacific was vastly different to that of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. This would give the fleet some much needed experience in carrier strike operations.

DEPARTURE

When HMS Victorious pulled into the Scottish port of Greenoch on November 23, 1942, she was hastily resupplied under a heavy veil of secrecy.

Some 40 Martlet fighters and extensive stocks of spare parts were loaded aboard before departure.

Victorious’ active air group at this time consisted of:

• 882 Squadron (12 Martlets) under Lieutenant Commander F.A. Shaw

• 896 Squadron (12 Martlets) under Lieutenant I.L.F. Lowe

• 832 Squadron (18 Albacores) under Lieutenant Commander W.J. Lucas.

Many of her crew had no idea of the carrier’s destination.

When HMS Victorious put to sea on December 20, she effectively vanished.

Only when the remainder of her air group had landed on would the ship’s new commanding officer, Captain L. D. Mackintosh, broadcast that Victorious had been detached from the Home Fleet and was headed towards Bermuda.

The carrier, escorted by the cruiser HMS Phoebe and the destroyers Quickmatch, Racehorse, and Redoubt, promptly sailed into a Force 9 gale for the majority of the crossing.

Send Her Victorious, by Michael Apps, reports one of her aircrew writing:

Rough, why on that trip even the rats got sick … On the second day out water started coming over the flight deck and down into the hangar deck, it was inches deep at times and splashed from side to side with every roll of the ship.

HMS Victorious’ Albacores were only able to resume anti-submarine patrols on Boxing Day, even though the ship was still pitching heavily. The risky flights were deemed necessary: Some 40 U-boats were believed operational in the Bermuda area.

The heavy weather had caused Victorious' escort to consume more fuel than expected. An attempt was made to refuel the destroyer HMS Redoubt. After starting well, the swell proved too great and the little ship was drawn into Victorious’ side - buckling the carrier’s radio masts upward as yet another hazard for nervous pilots.

“The Land-on was an experience similar to flying through a forest and hoping to miss the trees!”

The squadron reduced speed to provide the fuel-efficiency necessary for the destroyers to make landfall.

HMS Victorious would spend just eight hours in Bermuda (another source states six days) – though as something of a celebrity. US aircraft demonstrated a fascination for the “Limey flat top”, making many low passes to have a good look. Float planes even landed on the water and taxied slowly about the ship.

Again, once at sea, Captain Mackintosh broke the news to the quizzical crew. HMS Victorious would be headed to Norfolk Navy Yard in Virginia.

PREPARATIONS

The armoured carrier arrived in the US on December 31, 1942. She was dry-docked at Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia, to have US-standard TBS (Talk Between Ships) radios, the YB aircraft homing system and new radar equipment fitted (including a new vertical plot table).  Also embarked was a USN liaison team of signals officers and code specialists.

As the Royal Navy had little in the way of suitable clothing for the tropics, the crew of Victorious was also issued USN gear; Khaki for officers and blue-jeans and shirts for the enlisted men.

Among the US liaison aboard Victorious was a ‘batsman’ to instruct RN flight crew and deck operations personnel the intricacies of USN deck landing signals and procedures.

This was the only formal request made of HMS Victorious by the USN.

FAA pilots were not impressed with what they saw as the unnecessarily complicated and blind straight-on US deck landing system.  This was made worse as many of the US batsman’s signals were the exact opposite to their own. (For example, both arms raised and outstretched at 45 degrees high was ‘Go Higher’ for the FAA pilots. For USN pilots it meant ‘You Are Too High’)

But Captain Mackintosh insisted his pilots make the change. And make it effectively.

Captain Mackintosh was something of a rarity among the Royal Navy’s carrier commanders. He had been an FAA Observer, so he understood the challenges and technical considerations of naval flying.

The Captain had quickly become a regular presence among the aircrew in Victorious’ wardroom.

Such was his understanding that he had one of the new FAA Avengers hoisted aboard at the dockyard so it could be measured and weighed for appropriate lashing points to be installed on the deck and hangar.

Cross-deck operations were expected to be a vital part of Victorious’ operations from the outset. The senior US liaison officer, Commander Mitchell USN - previously a squadron commander on USS Hornet - was immediately engaged in a series of discussions relating to  Victorious' operational requirements and the Pacific's tactical situation.

All was not entirely for the benefit of the RN carrier. Captain Mackintosh had been instructed to make any and all information regarding HMS Victorious' Fighter Direction Office technology and techniques available.

According to a 2003 thesis by Chris Sheehy, "USS Robin” - An Account of HMS Victorious’ First Mission to the Pacific:

Mackintosh and his staff arrived in Washington on the 4 January 1943, where he called upon Admirals Sir Percy L.H. Noble and Sir Wilfred French, both of whom introduced Mackintosh to the staff of Admiral King. While in discussions the Americans showed a great interest in the layout of the British Fighter Direction Office. Mackintosh gave them an advanced copy of C.B. Direction Fighters in H.M. Ships. The book was then forwarded to the Bureau of Aeronautics.

Several members of the Bureau were then invited aboard Victorious to assess the FDO's layout for further evolution and integration into USN ships. One of these men, Lt Commander Owen, would be assigned as a liaison for the FDO for the duration of the carrier's deployment in the Pacific.

MODIFICATIONS

One of the more significant upgrades to HMS Victorious while in Norfolk Navy Yard was the removal of the aerodynamic aft ‘round down’ of the flight deck. This was replaced with an extended, flush deck.

The change - planned by the RN but carried out with gusto by a USN eager to get the ship into the Pacific -  considerably improved the deck area available for ranging aircraft. 

Essentially, it enabled the armoured carrier to carry a US-scale deck park for the first time. To that end a  new 16,000 pound mobile crane was brought aboard along with a tractor and two smaller towing vehicles to help speed up the juggling of aircraft on the carrier's deck.

Also incorporated into modification work was a platform beneath the stern overhang holding eight 20mm Oerlikon cannons. Another 12 had been distributed around the ship wherever space could be found - such as replacing the forward searchlights.

Additional changes included the upgrade of arresting cables to snare the heavy US Avengers, construction of a new mess space for the expanded flight deck crew, a hangar control station, the fitting of two US cipher machines in the Communications Office, the addition of three diesel fire pumps along with a new fog fire-suppression system in the crew spaces.

Storm damage to the bow was also repaired.

Letter from Commanding Officer, HMS Victorious to Secretary of Admiralty
[ADM 199/ 534] 1 February 1943

Refitting of HMS Victorious in Norfolk Navy Yard, 1– 31 January 1943

I have the honour to submit the following letter of proceedings for the period 1st to 31st, January, 1943, during which “VICTORIOUS” was refitting at Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia.

2. “VICTORIOUS” secured alongside the Navy Yard at 1800 on January 1st, 1943 and immediately the Yard Officers concerned with the refit came onboard to see me and to arrange for a full scale conference the following morning.

3. Commander Johnson, Lieutenant Commander Smeeton from British Admiralty Delegation, and Commander Mitchell U.S.N. the U.S. Naval Liaison Officer who will be permanently attached to “VICTORIOUS” – came aboard on arrival to discuss the future operational requirements. I was informed that the Navy Department had planned that “VICTORIOUS” should leave Norfolk on the 21st January and proceed to her future operational area.

4. After discussing the various problems involved, which included American Deck landing signals, deck landing capabilities of pilots (nine pilots had never landed on a carrier), familiarisation with new type of aircraft – T.B.F. 2 and F4F4’ s, 3 I decided to go to Washington to see the U.S. Navy authorities concerned with a view of asking for the stay at Norfolk to be prolonged by an extra week, and that a further month should be spent in an area where full scale ship and shore training facilities could be provided.

5. The length of these training periods I considered necessary, in order to train 832 Squadron to their new type of T.B.F. aircraft, to form three fighter squadrons; 882, 896 and 898, the last two being moved from Quonset Point, Rhode Island, and filled up with untrained pilots here brought from U.K., and also that “Victorious” would require a period with her own aircraft onboard before proceeding to her operational area.

6. The number and types of aircraft to be carried was also discussed and the complement it was decided at finally was 36 Martlet (F4F4) and 18 T.B.F’s. The number of T.B.F’s was dependent on the question of levelling the flight deck round down – this was considered most desirable, as not only would it allow six more T.B.F’s to be carried but it would increase the amount of take off run available.

7. The working up of the Squadrons was to take place at the Naval Air Station, Norfolk – (a report of the training of the Squadrons is being forwarded under a separate cover) but in passing I would mention that the introduction of the American Method of deck landing signals, and the subsequent alteration in method of approach has taken considerably longer than was first expected, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the month’s training at Norfolk, as difficulty was experienced by pilots (especially the more experienced ones) in adapting themselves to the American methods. In fact, little other training has taken place.

8. At meeting was held onboard “VICTORIOUS” which was attended by the Yard Officers, Mr Chapman chief Constructor representing the British Admiralty Delegation, and my officers. A full list of approved and proposed Alterations and Additions had been prepared before arrival. I found the Yard Officers most accommodating and willing to undertake essential requirements in the time available, if approval was obtained from Washington. I was very impressed with the speed at which things moved. Approval was obtained from the British Admiralty Maintenance Representative, Washington, next day to alter the round down, and work commenced on it that evening.

9. All Alterations and Additions which would increase the operational efficiency of the ship were approved and telephoned down so that work could commence immediately. Many other Alterations and Additions, under the heading “not yet provisionally approved” have also been completed.

10. I was impressed by the large number of Oerlikon guns in the U.S. Carriers. Having found nineteen suitable sites for such guns, the alteration was approved by British Admiralty Maintenance Representative and the guns are now fitted. This brings our total to thirty Oerlikons.

11. Amongst the alterations that have been carried out that were not initially considered, the following are the most important:–
(a) extension of the Round Down,
(b) the addition of nineteen extra Oerlikon Guns, eight of them on a platform on stern below the round down,
(c) removal of forward searchlights (one Oerlikon in each in lieu),
(d) fitting of vertical plot in F.D.O. office,
(e) removal of type 72 Beacon – YE Beacon fitted in lieu (aerial on mast on starboard side centre of funnel),
(f) installing three emergency Diesel Fire Pumps,
(g) installation of Fog Fire system in certain compartments and living accommodation,
(h) hangar Officer’s control position fitted to control hangar traffic and parking,
(i) two electric Coding machines …
(j) extra Mess Deck built for increased Flight Deck party on starboard side Upper Gallery Deck in place of potato locker.
(k) weather damage to bows repaired …

AVENGERS FOR THE FAA

The passage to San Cristobal allowed the ship to exercise the deck crew and the pilots. A lack of wind over the flight deck delayed some of the exercises. When they were able to resume, tests on the Avenger, fully loaded, showed that it could be stopped by the arrester gear, but it exerted a lot of pressure on the system and the wire played out almost to the crash barrier. This was a major problem that had to be addressed upon reaching Pearl Harbor. During the trip two Martlets were lost during these exercises, one due to engine failure on take off, the other caught fire in the air and the pilot was lost. Four Avengers also hit the crash barrier upon landing.

Another incident involved an overly fast landing which caused the tubby little fighter to bounce over the first crash barrier and into the second. The deck-park forward was fortunately not affected.

ROBIN JOINS THE HUNT

It is about this point that Victorious was given the radio call-sign “Robin”  as a half-hearted security/deception attempt. The name quickly caught on, with the ship frequently being called “USS Robin” tongue-in-cheek.

Whether “Robin” was a reference to the brightly coloured bird, or the legendary English outlaw Robin Hood, is unclear.

Nevertheless, a distinct trend evolved in communications involving the ship. Send her Victorious notes:

With a sense of humour and knowledge of ornithology, there was scope for some interesting signals.

PACIFIC PRESENCE

HMS Victorious arrived at San Cristobel, the eastern entrance of the Panama Canal, on February 11.

A USN battleship signalled "what ship?". The carrier reportedly replied "USS Robin" - even though the White Ensign was flying proudly from her mast.

Transiting the canal involved some effort: Several guns, cranes and radio masts had to be removed to allow the carrier to fit in the canal. Nevertheless, she lost her port submarine lookout’s position when it struck a lock entrance. Many more bumps and scrapes later, she was through. 

The crew was given two days in Panama City as Victorious had her gun sponsons and radio masts welded back on. Ray Barker comments in his book Victorious the World Over that a US Marine boarded the ship and presented a bill to Captain Mackintosh for damage done to the canal. Captain Mackintosh signed ‘LEASE LEND’ at the bottom of the report and nothing was mentioned ever again. 

Jim I. Gallie, RN, (HMS Victorious from Mar. 29, 1941 to Sept. 12, 1945): Manuscript

I was still at my old station in the ADP and so had a grandstand view of the little surprise which the Americans sprung on us.
We were just getting up to speed, when, out from behind an island about four or five miles ahead of us, six US MTBs ( or PT boats as the Americans called them) suddenly appeared to make a dummy attack on us. Immediately Capt, MacIntosh, who had first hand experience with Italian MTBs, turned straight towards them, giving them the narrowest target, ordered full speed, and all hands to action stations. Action stations were closed up and reported within three minutes. By this time we were up to near full speed, going nearly as fast as the PT boats, which must have given them a bit of a shock. By this time the two antagonists were closing at over seventy five knots (85 mph).
The PT boats torpedoes are set so that they could only be fired 10o either side of the bow, and they normally tried to come in right angles to the target’s fore and aft line. At the speed we were closing they did not have a show, and as they passed down the ships side, we theoretical raked them with every PomPom, Borfor, and Oerlikan, that could be brought to bear. We even tracked them with the 4.5 LA-HA guns just to drive the message home. They sprung the surprise, but I think we had the last laugh. Captain MacIntosh gave a commentry over the public address system later, a thing he did on a regular basis., and estimated that we would have sunk at least four of the six. His closing comment, “That will teach them not to play with the big boys”.
He also commented, that had they waited till we were closer before they came out of hiding, it might have been a different story.

LAST-MINUTE MODIFICATIONS

Once HMS Victorious arrived at Pearl Harbour on March 4, 1943, her air group was flown off to Ford Island for further working-up exercises with USN counterparts.

As soon as the ship itself pulled alongside, dockyard workers swarmed aboard.

They quickly affected any remaining repairs to damage caused by the Panama Canal passage and the serious fires - as well as adding yet more 20mm cannons, as well as twin 40mm and quadruple 40mm emplacements in front of the seaplane cranes.

The flattened aft flight deck, as fitted at Norfolk Navy Yard, allowed the Pearl Harbour engineers to add two US-style arresting wires behind the original Number 1 wire.  This increased both the number of wires available to be caught and the distance before reaching the first crash barriers.

Sheehy reports:

The original equipment was modified to reduce the amount of pull out that occurred when the plane’s hook caught the wire. A great benefit was the installation of air conditioning in the Fighter Direction Office. Another complaint of Mitchell’s was remedied as well; a new loud hailer system was installed, as well as hinged plates over various indents in the flight deck to allow for a smoother surface, and a new deck landing officers platform.

Ashore, the FAA Avengers had their ‘hook’s enlarged to better catch RN cables.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Much of the US Navy’s dislike for the Royal Navy’s armoured carriers seemed to stem from the report submitted by chief USN liaision officer Commander Samuel Mitchell at this time. According to Sheehy:

Mitchell had some reservations about the design of the ship as well. Less aviation fuel storage would cause the ship to be refuelled more often than a USN carrier. The lifts were a tight squeeze for the larger Avenger, and time had to be taken to make sure the plane was in the lift just right to enable it to be raised or lowered; this time was precious in the big carrier battles of the Pacific. He also found the repair facilities in the ship to be inadequate to handle the number of aircraft embarked. There was no direct communication between a deck officer and the hangar, and the loud speaker system could not be heard over the warming up of the engines, so no last minute changes could be affected in emergencies. A major safety hazard of the ship was the steel floor of the deck and hangar, which would become extremely slippery with a bit of water and oil, which was always present, for it leaked out of the exhaust of the planes as they warmed up. The armoured hangar prevented the warming up of a second strike in the hangar due to a lack of vents, thus severely slowing the time between a first and second wave of a strike. The ship was ill equipped with portable CO2 fire extinguishers, and had no crash dollies, which could have prevented a lot of the fire damage done to the ship during two of the crashes during the exercises.

His opinions were backed up by visiting USN personnel. They could not understand the need for so much armour in the place of additional aircraft. Much later, the USN liaison officers assigned to the British Pacific Fleet would initially repeat this attitude. But experience with kamikazes soon saw the tone of their reports change.

While the armour was derided, the skills and techniques of Victorious’ Fighter Direction Office again  drew much admiration. 

But Admiral King made his displeasure known in a letter to General George C Marshall, dated April 7: He claimed HMS Victorious was in a poor state of general readiness, making her "so far of no use".

Meanwhile HMS Victorious’ original FAA aircraft received another modification. The red circle at the centre of the British ‘roundel’ was recognised as being too similar to the Japanese ‘Meatball’ from a distance for nervous US gunners. All aircraft were to be repainted with American-style markings, most notably the prominent white star.

Victorious had also exchanged her Admiralty disruptive camouflage scheme for a uniform coat of USN blue-grey paint.

With her modifications complete, Victorious was reunited with her air group via dockyard crane: Her Martlets and Avengers were hoisted aboard from the adjoining air base.

HMS Victorious departed Pearl Harbor on May 8, pointing her bows towards the South West Pacific with USS North Carolina and three destroyers in formation.

The carrier deployed with 52 aircraft aboard: It had been intended for Victorious to carry 42 Martlets, but only 47 were available on the US West Coast. Victorious deployed with 36 to reduce overcrowding and provide a small stock of aircraft at Pearl for training.

• 882 Squadron with 12 Martlet IV (all F4F-4B standard)

• 896 Squadron, 12 Martlet IV

• 898 Squadron, 12 Martlet IV

• 832 Squadron, 16 Avengers

At the time, the much larger USS Saratoga was operating:

• VF-5 with 34 F4F4

• VB-3 with 19 SBD-3

• VS-3 with 18 SBD-3

• VT-8 with 16 TBF-1

The fresh arrivals joined Rear Admiral DeWitt Ramsey’s Carrier Division 1  - USS Saratoga – off Noumea in the New Hebrides on May 17. Together they were the only operational allied fleet carriers in the Pacific.

TASK FORCE 14

Initially USS Saratoga and HMS Victorious set sail on an offensive sweep north of the Solomon Islands barely 23 hours after the RN carrier arrived. Intelligence reports suggested the Japanese fleet had set sail north from Truk, but could swing south and attack the Coral Sea.

It was the first time a USN and RN carrier had operated together, though they were at this early point operating their air groups largely independently. HMS Victorious immediately adapted to the tight USN fleet formation, with the two carriers at the centre of a tight circle of escorts. Her 'point defence' was just 2000 yards away - an escorting battleship.

The armoured carrier's officers and crew were suitably impressed as USS Saratoga embarked 60 aircraft in 45 minutes as the Task Force headed out to sea.

Send Her Victorious reports John Fay’s account of the day:

“I watched from the goofer’s platform and was in mental agony when the deck was clear and the ship into the wind, before the aircraft were in position to land on. But every aircraft landed well and we had them all aboard in seven minutes which compared well with the Americans. Later that day I was watching some of our Martlets landing on; there was a misunderstanding when one of them wanted an emergency landing and the others did not realise it, but all was well until … it happened. A Martlet landed and as it touched down its guns went off. It was thought at first that the shots had gone into the sea without doing any damage, but in fact it quickly transpired that three people were hit, including the Navigating Officer. Apparently the bullets had ricocheted round Commander Flying’s platform before hitting him, but he was not badly hurt.

The RN carrier was tasked with anti-submarine duties, and put nine of her Avengers on the job. Martlets also contributed to the CAP rotation.

It again quickly became evident to the USN Task Force commanders that Victorious’ fighter direction team held a significant edge over their own.

The RN jad just come through Operation Pedestal where careful management of Sea Hurricanes, Martlets and Fulmars had managed to prevent damage from repeated and sustained air attacks to all but one of the vital supply convoy while under the care of the carriers.

US Liaison officers were tasked to pay attention and take notes.

Task Force 14, with the battleships USS North Carolina, Massachusetts and Indiana along with the cruisers USS San Diego, San Juan and HMAS Australia,  returned to Noumea on May 24 once it became obvious the Japanese were not conducting a feint.

Here, six USN F4F-4 Wildcats were handed over to replace those lost in deck landing accidents since Victorious had departed Pearl.

The reserve FAA Martlets had suffered something of a disaster: A supply of these Wildcats modified to RN specifications had been wrecked by a hurricane while being ferried to Pearl Harbour. 

Other supplies, including rum, were taken from Royal Australian Navy stores.

Rum had proved problematic for Victorious during her deployment with the USN: The ship had already run "dry" twice.

Jim I. Gallie, RN, (HMS Victorious from Mar. 29, 1941 to Sept. 12, 1945): Manuscript

We went out several times with Saratoga and North Carolina though the rest of May, and into June including the first Cross-Carrier operation when we swapped aircraft with Saratoga. The weather was glorious, and the war seemed a long way away.
One trick we learned after our first trip out. Unlike the RN, whose ships entered harbour in orderly procession, the Americans got to within three or four miles of the entrance, then it was every man for himself. We got caught on the hop the first time, but after that, Capt. McIntosh put the foot down, and we were at anchor before the other big boys got in. This turned into quite a competition, and it was amazing that there were no collisions, but with our speed advantage, only the destroyers had any chance of beating us.

CROSS-DECK OPERATIONS

Between June 1 and 3 Victorious and Saratoga conducted training exercises off New Caledonia to ensure USN procedures were being habitually followed.

During the exercise Victorious welcomed Rear Admiral Ramsay and Captain Mulliner, commander of Saratoga, aboard as observers.

Commander Mitchell: 

I was a bit disappointed, I’ll admit, in the results of that because I wanted the British to look good and although they did look fairly good it was a spotty operation due partly to the structural and space limitations of the ship. She never will operate as well or as fast or take the number of planes our carriers do.

Captain Mackintosh would next visit USS Saratoga during a four-day training manouvre.

Commander Mitchell again:

When we came back in we had a conference and the key British officers of the VICTORIOUS went out and watched the SARATOGA operate. Their eyes were opened as to what smart carrier operation is. I will say that I think SARATOGA has one of the smartest flight deck crews that I’ve seen in operation. They have been out there a long time; they are good; and the SARATOGA, with her slow elevators, was not held up a bit on fast operation, because the flight deck plane handling crews jumped on the planes and functioned beautifully as a team all the way through.

To further reinforce standards – as well as a spirit of cooperation – the ships swapped aircraft and aircrew on the final day of yet another set of exercises between June 16 and 20 (June 18 saw Saratoga and Victorious conducting joint night flying exercises).

Emergency cross-deck landing exercises were also conducted: Six FAA Avengers and 12 Martlets landed on Saratoga. Eight Avengers, six Dauntless and 12 Wildcats from Saratoga nested aboard Victorious.

The social and procedural experiment took place flawlessly.

As a result, the US Task Force commanding officers agreed that it would be viable to employ “USS Robin” as a dedicated fighter carrier, with an additional 24 Wildcats of VF-3  aboard and her own Avengers ‘re-based’ temporarily aboard USS Saratoga.

Letter from Commanding Officer, HMS Victorious
to Secretary of Admiralty
[ADM 199/ 838] 7 August 1943

Operations of 832 Squadron flying from USS Saratoga,
27 June – 24 July 1943

The attached report by the Commanding Officer, 832 Squadron, on aircraft operation and maintenance in “SARATOGA”, is forwarded for the information of Their Lordships.

2. 832 Squadron was embarked in U.S.S. “SARATOGA” for a 28 days sortie in the recent NEW GEORGIA operation, from 27th. June to 25th. July, when “SARATOGA” operated all the T.B.F. and S.B.D.  aircraft and “VICTORIOUS” operated 24 of “SARATOGA’S” Wildcats in addition her own 36 fighters.

3. The following letter was received from the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. “SARATOGA”, through the Task Group Commander, on completion of the sortie:–

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S “Saratoga”
To: The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. “Victorious”
Via: The Commander Task Force FOURTEEN.

Subject: Operations of 832 Squadron, Fleet Air Arm, Period 27 June to 24 July, Inclusive 1943

1. During the past four weeks Squadron 832 has operated from this ship as a unit of the SARATOGA AIR GROUP. Availability of the “Tarpons” 4 of that squadron increased the potential striking power of the Air Group very materially. Routine daily operations were conducted with gratifying precision and efficiency, in both fair and foul weather.

2. Close association with the officers and men of 832 Squadron in this ship has been most pleasant. The SARATOGA is happy to have been host to them. The bearing of the Royal Navy personnel has reflected the leadership and engaging personality of the squadron commander, Acting Lieutenant Commander (A) R.N. (P) F.K.A. LOW. The Commanding Officer takes pleasure in congratulating you, and the officers and men of 832 Squadron, especially Lieutenant Commander Low, upon the operating proficiency and high morale prevailing in that unit.

H.M. MULLINNIX, CAPTAIN U.S.N.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO CO SARATOGA Letter.

To: The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. “Victorious”
Subject: Operations of 832 Squadron, Fleet Air Arm,
Period 27 June to 24 July, inclusive 1943.

1. The personnel referred to by Captain Mullinnix also were under my intimate observation during the period of their duty in the SARATOGA. It is a pleasure to me to fully endorse his remarks. The Officers and Men of the VICTORIOUS adapted themselves so smoothly and efficiently to the operations and routine of the SARATOGA that the only distinguishing feature to me was their uniforms.

2. I was particularly pleased to hold several interesting conversations with Lieutenant Commander Low who obviously is a squadron leader and an officer of the highest type.

D.C. RAMSEY., ADMIRAL, U.S.N.

TASK GROUP 36.3

The Pacific force put out to sea on June 27 to cover amphibious troop landings on New Georgia in the Solomon Islands. Task Group 36.3 would take up a ‘covering’ station some 300 miles offshore in the Coral Sea, on hand in case the Japanese fleet attempted to intervene.

In her role as CAP and fighter carrier, HMS Victorious was operating 60 Martlets and Wildcats.

USS Saratoga retained 12 Wildcats along with her 36 Dauntless and 20 USN Avengers. The 15 FAA Avengers operated from her deck for the whole operations.

The carriers took no part in the actual invasion itself, but remained protectively on station for a full 28 days, as Task Group 36.3 under Rear Admiral F. P. Sherman.

An extensive search was conducted for Japanese naval forces, with aircraft fanning out more than 200 miles from their base ships.

Commander Mitchell, USN, was much more positive at this point:

That whole operation was indicative of what you could do with fairly well trained outfits and free interchange of information. The British squadron liked to work on the American carrier, and our boys seemed to like the British carrier, probably because they could get a drink before dinner in the evening, or perhaps for the novelty.

On July 12, HMS Victorious was to conduct an underway replenishment from the USN tankers Cimarron and Kaskaskia. She successfully took aboard 3270 tonnes of fuel oil, 30,283 gallons of avgas, 625 gallons of lubrication oil – and 20 gallons of ice cream for her USN cohort.

But, by July 20, HMS Victorious had run out of potatoes.

A heavily burdened Avenger, dubbed ‘Spud Express’ in chalk on its fuselage, made an emergency flight from Saratoga carrying 800lbs of dehydrated potato powder in its bomb bay. In the navigator’s seat was a cook – to teach the RN how to whip up a ‘perfect’ pot of mash. 

The USN, quite practiced at keeping ships at sea for about 80 days, demonstrated repeatedly the art of transferring stores at sea.

Jim Gallie commented:

But when it came to oiling, they left us way behind. The tanker would take station and with their high speed pumps and side by side configuration, they would oil four destroyers or two capital ships or any combination, in less than half the time we took with our own oilers.
When the oilier was servicing the smaller ships, cruisers and destroyers, they were on and off like calves on a milk dispenser.

The aggressive patrol found no targets. HMS Victorious and Task Group 36.3 returned to Noumea on July 25 after operating continuously at sea for 28 days, steaming 12,233 miles at 18.1 knots. This was a record for an RN aircraft carrier. The 614 sorties flown from her deck had resulted in only eight accidents - the lowest accident rate yet recorded.

In comparison, Operation Torch had lasted 22 days. Victorious had conducted 233 sorties and suffered six accidents.

The only taste of action came in the last days of the operation: A USN Dauntless pilot spotted a solo ‘Betty’ bomber some 50 miles out from the fleet. His guns had no effect and the ‘Betty’ escaped before the CAP fighters could arrive.

The cross-decking experiment had proved to be a success, though no doubt the FAA aircrew were glad to be back in Victorious’ “wet” (alcohol available) wardroom and the USN pilots pleased to return to their more spacious accommodation and ice cream.

By the end of July the first of the US Navy’s new ‘Essex’ and ‘Independence’ class carriers were reaching operational status in the Central Pacific.

It was decided HMS Victorious could return to her Atlantic theatre of operations.

Five of her 11 surviving Avengers were disembarked as reserves for US forces, while 52 of USS Saratoga’s aircrew and two Japanese prisoners of war were brought aboard for the passage back to the United States.

Victorious had during her three months in the South West Pacific steamed some 23,000 miles and conducted 2101 deck landings.

Now she was going home

On July 31, the Royal Navy carrier departed Noumea in the company of USS Indiana, Converse, Boyd and Halford as Task Unit 34.5.1.

Wildcats and Avengers from USS Saratoga attempted to ‘beat up’ (a nail-bitingly fast and low fly-past) HMS Victorious as a farewell gesture, but two collided. The damage was not severe (an Avenger’s propeller chewed up part of another’s tail – both managed to make it back to deck), but the metal debris rained down on the British carrier as an unexpected supply of souvenirs.

AFTERMATH

HMS Victorious arrived in Pearl Harbour on August 9 to see the future of the USN Pacific Fleet arrayed before her. Three fast assault carriers, three light fleet carriers and two escort carriers were sitting in the harbour.

They were ready to join the fight.

Victorious remained only long enough to refuel, reprovision and shuffle passengers. While the 33 USN officers and men embarked at Norfolk to supplement her crew were surrendered, a total of 85 were now on board for the passage to San Diego

She set sail again on August 12.

The armoured carrier crossed back into the Atlantic on August 26 and arrived at Norfolk Navy Yard on September 1.

All USN radios, cyphers and and other equipment was stripped out.

However, fresh damage from the second Panama Canal transit was repaired. A new SG radar system was installed and the tired Wildcat and Avenger veterans of the Pacific operations replaced with fresh aircraft.

The carrier returned to the Clyde on September 26, 1943, before moving on to Liverpool’s Gladstone Dock for a refit which lasted until March 4, 1944.

During this period Captain Mackintosh departed the carrier, replaced by Captain Denny.

OVERVIEW

Chris Sheehy, "USS Robin” - An Account of HMS Victorious’ First Mission to the Pacific:

With an insider’s view of cutting edge of modern naval warfare, Captain Mackintosh was able to relate to the Admiralty how the USN operated, and what lessons if any the RN could learn and incorporate into the RN doctrine. The Victorious had used different techniques in deck landings, carried a deck park, used and observed the modern radar and gunnery of the USN, used a different screening method in repelling attackers from the air and a different refuelling system at sea. Curiously, few of these developments were adopted by the RN before the end of the war...

Many of the observations made by Captain Mackintosh were nonetheless acted upon when the war was over. Many of these dealt with the welfare of the crew. The use of ice cream, efficient mail service and other morale boosters such as movies, were instituted after 1945 by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, who had commanded of the British Pacific Fleet in 1944-1945. Like Mackintosh, he observed the marked difference between the morale of the USN and the RN. He realized, especially when the RN needed to attract and retain its sailors, that a change had to be made to make the Navy a more attractive career, and when he became First Sea Lord, he set out to change the RN to take more regard for the state and welfare of its men.

More on HMS Victorious