Armoured Aircraft Carriers in World War II

ORIGINS

The idea of a surprise torpedo aircraft raid against a harbour was not a new one. A planned RN seaplane torpedo attack against the German naval base at Wilhelmshaven failed to eventuate before the end of World War I.

The United States navy had already experienced surprise carrier attacks on Pearl Harbor - as part of the Fleet Problem 13 exercises in 1932, and again in 1938. 

Rear Admiral Yarnell was in charge of the 'aggressor' force - including the 'scout' carriers Saratoga and Lexington, battleships and escorts. It was assumed he would attack with his battleships. But he left them behind. At dawn on Sunday February 7, 1932, a force of some 152 aircraft was launched against the harbour from the north-east, first attacking the army airfields before targeting battleship row. War-game umpires declared the attack a total surprise, and total success. Lexington and Saratoga repeated the achievement in similar games during 1938 - following up with a successful surprise strike against the naval facilities in San Francisco.

The Royal Navy kept the idea of harbour strikes alive in the late 20s and early 30s. However, it first started seriously thinking about attacking the Italian naval base of Taranto as as early as 1935.

Admiral William Wordsworth Fisher, then commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, feared he may soon be in a war with Italy after Mussolini ordered the invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia).  The Royal Navy was making its presence felt under the auspices of the League of Nations. The rhetoric was heated.

Fisher summoned his commander of carriers – Rear Admiral Alexander Ramsay – and ordered a detailed breakdown of what it would take to strike a crippling blow against the Italian fleet.

The job of refining the detail of a raid on Taranto was given to the senior air crew aboard HMS Glorious. But the British government and League of Nations ultimately failed to intervene. The embryonic plan was sealed and shelved.

Another international crisis erupted just three years later. Germany annexed Austria. The emergence of the Axis coalition between Hitler and Mussolini appeared to make war in Europe almost inevitable.

Admiral Dudley Pound, who had replaced Fisher as commander of the Mediterranean fleet, decided it was time to revisit the idea of a crippling, pre-emptive blow against the Italian fleet.

Pound was so convinced of the imminence of war that he ordered his fleet out of its anchorage in Malta to the more distant facility at Alexandria, Egypt.

HMS Glorious’ Captain, Lumley St George Lyster, was summoned aboard the flagship HMS Queen Elizabeth to pour over the old Abyssinian Crisis notes. His job was to draw up a new plan accommodating fresh developments in both Italian and British defences and technologies.

Lyster, with the assistance of Commander (Flying) Guy Willoughby and Senior Observer Commander Lachlan Mackintosh, put HMS Glorious’ air group through an intense period of tests and training all designed to evaluate the chances of successfully striking the Taranto facility.

The outline of a plausible plan soon emerged: The attack would have to take place at night (for which HMS Glorious’ air group had been in training). A bomb attack on the shore installations would act as a diversion as the main attack – by torpedo – developed. All would be illuminated by air-dropped flares.

HMS Glorious’ air command staff calculated a casualty rate of roughly 10 per cent.

Admiral Pound, however, was not convinced. He believed losses to both aircraft and aircrew would be much higher. The risk to his ships, he thought, was also prohibitive. As a result he deemed such a raid to be a contingency instead of an active plan. He did not relay the idea to his Admiralty superiors.

As tensions diminished once again, interest in the raid diminished.

For a second time, the idea was shelved.

But Glorious’ Mediterranean foray would have lasting influence on the FAA: Those who served in her pre-war would win a total of 5 DSOs and 28 DSCs.

PRELUDE

When Italy declared war on June 10, 1940, the Royal Navy was operating only a reduced squadron of cruisers and the old carrier HMS Eagle in the Mediterranean.

After all, the Mediterranean was France’s responsibility and Britain’s fleet had been fighting to maintain control over the North Sea and interdict Germany’s invasion of Norway.

Mediterranean stalwart HMS Glorious had been sent to reinforce the Home Fleet in April 1940. Soon she would fall to the guns of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau – without a single aircraft in the air.

France’s capitulation in May 1940 was a catastrophic blow.

But Admiral Cunningham – who had stepped into the shoes of commander of the Mediterranean fleet in 1939 - strove to maintain the initiative. Cunningham boldly deployed what ships he had to the central Mediterranean as both provocation and protection.

He had little choice.

Britain was in a bind: The Royal Navy now had to run convoys from Gibraltar to Malta, and again from Malta to Alexandria. This meant running a gauntlet including airbases in Sardinia and Sicily, the narrow waters around Pantelleria Island, and more airbases on the south of the Italian peninsulas well as along the north coast of Africa.

The Italians were running their own heavily protected convoys – inevitably crossing the path of the British as they ploughed the waters between Italy and Libya.

Looming large over this strategic nautical crossroads were the major naval bases of Valletta, and Taranto.

The first clash came on July 9, merely a month after Italy declared war. HMS Warspite hit the battleship Giulio Cesare with a 15-inch shell at extreme range during the Battle of Calabria. HMS Eagle – operating just 18 Swordfish and three Sea Gladiators – launched several torpedo attacks against Italy’s capital ships, but none struck home.

Italy’s retaliation by air proved to be a revelation: More than 400 bombs were dropped on the British fleet.

Cunningham wrote after the war:

It is not too much to say of those early months that the Italians’ high-level bombing was the best I have ever seen, far better than the German’s

But, from this point, the Italian fleet demonstrated a growing reluctance to engage in a fight – despite Cunningham ‘trailing his coat-tails’ (making aggressive sorties) some 16 times during the following months.

Cunningham’s plight, however, was somewhat relieved in August 1940. Reinforcements finally arrived.

The heavily modernised battleship HMS Valiant brought with her a modern suite of radar and anti-aircraft guns. So too did the two light anti-aircraft cruisers in her company.

But most significant was the arrival of the freshly commissioned HMS Illustrious.

Cunningham already had a plan.

Pound had told Cunningham of the idea to raid Taranto when handing over command. But key personnel – including HMS Glorious’ Captain Lyster – had long since moved on.

Ark Royal, however, had provided a tantalising taste of what was possible: Six of her Swordfish successfully swooped on the French battlecruiser Dunkerque in Oran harbour. Passing over the breakwater from out of the sun, four torpedoes – all dropped in the shallows – had found their mark.

And now the Taranto raid’s chief architect, Captain Lyster, was back as Rear Admiral (Carriers), aboard HMS Illustrious.

ENTER ILLUSTRIOUS

The name-ship of a new class – and a new concept – of aircraft carrier, HMS Illustrious had been launched in 1939 and completed in May 1940. Like most RN carriers, she immediately set sail for Bermuda to conduct an intensive working-up program for both ship and aircrew.

It was during these exercises that the more experienced Fleet Air Arm pilots determined to find ways to enhance the survivability of their lumbering Swordfish.  The pilots discovered the slow but nimble biplane could quickly be stalled – virtually hanging in the air by its propeller at low level before flicking off to one side – causing the attacking aircraft to overshoot and become disoriented.

During one such fighter evasion exercise the ‘enemy’ aircraft – an FAA machine - became disoriented and crashed into the sea. It was a tactic to be reproduced effectively several times in the heat of real combat.

Illustrious would return to her home port on July 26.

Fully fuelled, stocked and nesting a full complement of aircraft, HMS Illustrious would receive Admiral Lyster aboard on the 19th of August. On August 22, HMS illustrious headed down the river Clyde and set course for Gibraltar.

On August 30 she joined Force F, along with Valiant and the old cruisers Calcutta and Coventry,. They would sortie with Force H – the carrier Ark Royal, the battlecruiser Renown, the cruiser Sheffield and 12 destroyers – along with a convoy of three merchant ships to Malta.

As Illustrious slipped past the Pantelleria narrows and cruised by Malta on September 2 she would deliver six Swordfish, and a large stock of spare parts, to the FAA unit based there.

Illustrious had barely finished tying up in Alexandria before Admiral Lyster and Captain Boyd were summoned aboard Cunningham’s flagship. At the top of the agenda was the ‘best way to annoy the Italians’.

Naturally, the idea of attacking the battleships in Taranto harbour rose to the fore.

Admiral Lyster and Captain Boyd were faced with a formidable challenge. The raid could no longer be a pre-emptive surprise attack, as originally intended. Instead, the RN’s carrier aircraft would be launched against a naval facility already on a full war footing.

Air crews, while well trained, would need considerable real war experience before attempting such a daring feat. So a gruelling series of raids were planned in conjunction with escort operations in the lead up to the portentous attack date Cunningham had set – October 21, Trafalgar Day.

AN AMERICAN EXCEPTION

Aboard HMS Illustrious was Lieutenant Commander John N. Opie III, USN. After just three days training for his new role of naval observer, Opie soon found himself bundled across the Atlantic and dumped in harm’s way aboard a variety of active British warships.

He wasn’t really supposed to be there. His mere presence was a direct violation of neutrality.

But the USN was adamant that any and all intelligence he could provide on how modern equipment and doctrine was performing in actual warfare – instead of in theory – would prove invaluable.

As a result, Opie would end up submitting dozens of reports detailing his direct observations as well as arranging for the forwarding of many of the RN’s own Top Secret internal reports and reviews.

Taranto would be among his most significant experiences.

 THE PLAN

As the RN practiced and established its naval aviation doctrine during the 1930s – largely aboard HMS Glorious – it had ruled out the notion of dawn and dusk torpedo attacks.

The idea sounded nominal: Enemy ships would be silhouetted against the sunrise or sunset while the attacking aircraft would be lost against the gloom of the dark sky.

But, at least in the Mediterranean, the Sun would rise and set very quickly. Timing the attack therefore needed to be impractically precise.

Therefore the RN began practicing night carrier-launched air attacks – the only nation to do so.

In 1940, the Italians already feared air-strikes from the RN carriers. Harassment raids had been ongoing from day one. A Mediterranean-spanning network of informants, surveillance aircraft and submarines was quickly geared to keeping the Regia Marina informed as to the whereabouts of these deadly ships.

So great care would need to be taken in concealing the RN’s intentions.

Cunningham devised a cunning deception, which also served to further Britain’s growing needs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Two carriers, five battleships, nine cruisers, 27 destroyers and 11 merchant ships put to sea at the same time. These were divided into five task forces and three convoys – each with different objectives and destinations.

ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE

SWORDFISH TSR (Torpedo, Spotter, Reconnaissance)

Nobody ever called the Fairy torpedo bomber by its designation, TSR 2. Even Swordfish was rarely used. Instead, a nickname made in jest by someone commenting on its ability to carry a startling array of weapons had stuck – permanently:

“No housewife on a shopping spree could have crammed more into her string bag,”

Stringbag it would remain. No doubt assisted by the radial-engined aircraft’s ungainly array of struts, wires and fabric-covered tubing.

The name also exposes an error in many modern accounts of the aircraft. It was not a design anachronism. It represented the pinnacle of proven, applied practical technology. As such, it was immensely flexible, durable and reliable.

Despite common assertions to the contrary, the Swordfish was also designed to be a dive bomber. It had been a Greek Government's requirements during the aircraft's development, stipulated before it lost interest. Nevertheless, the wire and steel-tube frame had been stressed to accommodate this.

The Swordfish could be stood on its nose, its fixed undercarriage, struts and dual mainplanes keeping it slow enough and controllable enough to deliver its weapons accurately.

What was lacking was the conviction in the RAF, and therefore the RN’s inter-war air arm, that this was the most effective means of delivering a bomb. As a result, training and practice in the technique was scarce.

The Swordfish’s greatest weakness, however, was its speed. Official performance testing figures give the biplane a top speed of 143mph while burdened with its 18inch, 1550lb MkXII torpedo. Aircrew, however, repeatedly report Stringbags encumbered with a torpedo and long-range fuel tanks maxed-out at just 93 knots.

In windy conditions, this made even chasing a battleship a laborious task.

Key to its survivability – along with the new stall tactics being developed by Illustrious’ pilots – was its impressive low-level, low-speed manoeuvrability. At wave-top heights, a jinking Swordfish could prove incredibly hard to hit.

At Taranto, the Swordfish's strength lay in its ability to be thrown about at night in extreme manoeuvres while in confined spaces - and at zero feet.

SHALLOW-WATER TORPEDOES

The shallow waters of the Taranto anchorage posed a challenge for air-dropped torpedoes. These had tendency to dive deep before the guidance mechanism kicked in and brought them up to a pre-set depth.

But a solution had been found.

The Fleet Air Arm did not use timber attachments to their torpedoes in the same manner as the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, as many accounts report. (It was the Italians that developed this technique for dropping torpedoes from their SM79 trimotors. This was passed on to Japanese delegations in 1940/41).

Instead, each 18-inch Mk XII torpedo was linked to its Swordfish by a strand of wire. This would hold the nose of the torpedo up as it fell to the water, producing a belly-flop instead of a dive.  This enabled them to be dropped in water as shallow as 22 feet.

At Taranto the torpedoes were set to run at 27 knots at a pre-set depth of 33 feet. This was calculated to enable the torpedoes to pass under anti-torpedo netting while still allowing the new Duplex magnetic warheads to ‘sense’ a warship above and explode while passing beneath, or detonate on contact. Taranto's battleship harbour had an average depth of 49 feet.

LONG RANGE FUEL TANKS

While the Swordfish had an excellent naval endurance, handy for loitering on anti-submarine patrols, it had a poor cruising speed. This amounted to a reasonably short radius of action.

To keep Illustrious safe, the torpedo and dive bombers would have to carry external fuel tanks.

In the case of the torpedo bomber, this had to be in the cockpit: the usual spot, slung between the wheels, was occupied by the torpedo.

As a result, a 60 gallon tank was secured to the Observer's booth behind the pilot by metal straps. The Observer, and his plot-board, now had to take the smaller seat previously occupied by the air gunner.

In the case of the dive-bombing Swordfish, a more traditional tank would be strapped under the fuselage. Their six bombs were attached to the wings, three on each side.

RADAR FIGHTER DIRECTION

The Royal Navy was now engaging in an entirely new form of warfare: radar direction. Experimentation by Ark Royal in combining radar plots of approaching enemy aircraft with navigational calculations - and then transmitting an intercept course to a standing fighter patrol - had proven inordinately successful.

As a result HMS Illustrious had had her completion date delayed by up to three months in order for new masts to be installed, air warning radars fitted – and space found for rudimentary fighter direction facilities.

It would immediately pay off.

Wherever Illustrious went, her combination of radar, directors and fighters brought with her local air superiority.

Reconnaissance aircraft were now regularly being knocked out of the sky before they could make their reports. Those that survived were often too busy taking evasive action to gather a comprehensive report on the number and types of ships in formation.

 Incoming raids were sustaining serious losses, as well as having their bombing runs disrupted.

But such a directed CAP posed an even more fundamental problem. Attacking aircraft often had to be very careful of their fuel management because of the extreme ranges involved. Evading interceptors – either by attempting to out-flank their movements or by hiding in cloud – took extra speed and time.

The CAP fighters had their mobile airfield beneath them, so fuel management played much less on their minds.

In 1940, such fighter coordination at sea was entirely new and unique to the Royal Navy.

Commander Opie, USN, took careful note.

MALTA RECONNAISSANCE

Central to Operation Judgement’s success was the possession of detailed intelligence as to the composition and location of Taranto’s defences.

The Short Sunderland flying boats based in Malta were inadequate: they were simply too slow and flew too low to survive flying over such a heavily protected shore facility.

But, in September 1940, three RAF Martin Marylands of 431 General Reconnaissance Flight arrived. These were capable of 278mph with a ceiling greater than 28,000ft. This put them out of reach of any fighter the Italians then possessed.

Soon Rear Admiral Lyster’s intelligence team picked out the shapes of gun emplacements, searchlights and anti-torpedo nets around the harbour. Strange blobs were eventually realised to be moored barrage balloons.

This was a serious obstacle: at night, the cables slung beneath them would be invisible.

THE BATTLE FLEET

FORCE A:

Carrier squadron:

HMS Illustrious (Flag Rear Admiral Lyster)
806 Squadron: 15 Fulmar MkI
815 Squadron: 9 Swordfish
819 Squadron: 9 Swordfish
813 Squadron*: 4 Swordfish, 2 Sea Gladiator
824 Squadron*: 2 Swordfish
* Detached from HMS Eagle

HMS Eagle*: 824 Squadron, 17 Swordfish;  3 Sea Gladiator
813 Squadron: 9 Swordfish
824 Squadron: 9 Swordfish
813 Fighter Flight: 4 Sea Gladiator
* Aircraft from 813 Squadron & Fighter Flight, 824 Squadron not yet detached to Illustrious.

Battle squadron:

HMS Warspite (Flag Admiral Cunningham), Valiant, Malaya, Ramillies

Destroyer squadron:

HMS Decoy, Defender, Hasty, Havoc, Hereward, Hero, Hyperion, Ilex, Janis, Jervis, Juno and Mohawk.

FORCE B:

HMAS Sydney, HMS Ajax, 2x destroyers

FORCE C:

HMS Orion (Flag Rear Admiral Pridham-Wippell)

FORCE F:

HMS Barham, Berwick, Glasgow, with the destroyers HMS Greyhound, Gallant, Griffin (supplemented by Faulknor, Fortune and Fury upon detachment from Force H)

FORCE H

HMS Ark Royal (Flag Vice-Admiral Somerville)

HMS Sheffield, 8x destroyers

CONVOY AN-6

HMS Calcutta, Coventry, destroyers HMS Dainty, HMAS Vampire, Waterhen, Voyager, 3x slow freighters.

CONVOY MW-3

HMS York, Gloucester, Coventry, 3x destroyers, 7x merchants

STRIKE FORCE (Taranto detachment)

HMS Illustrious
HMS York, Berwick, Glasgow, Glouchester and the destroyers Hasty, Havock, Hyperion and Ilex

FORCE X (detachment)

HMAS Sydney, Orion, Ajax with destroyers Mohawk and Nubian. 

ITALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE

TARANTO

Italy’s air force was adamant it could constantly surveil all approaches to mainland facilities. This would provide ample time for warships to mobilise and bombers to scramble.

But, at Taranto, an alternative form of early warning was offered by 13 sound-detection devices placed at strategic points around the harbour. These were capable of “hearing” aircraft out to 25 nautical miles (29 miles or 46km). It was sufficient notice to bring to alert the searchlight and gun crews, though not enough for an effective air-defence scramble.

Then there were the 22 searchlights strung out around both harbours in the hope of catching attacking ships and aircraft in their beams to provide easier sighting for the array of defending guns.

Defending the base was 21 gun batteries of dual-purpose – though World War I vintage - 4in guns. On the shore were 13 mounts, while the remaining eight were installed on immobile barges anchored along the boundary of the Mar Grande.

Close-range protection was offered 84 20mm Breda anti-aircraft guns and 109 13.2mm Breda machine guns. These were in a mix of single and twin mounts.

Finally, there were the guns and searchlights aboard the warships themselves. The base commander had stipulated that ships were limited to using only their armament while under direct attack. The order's read:

‘No barrage fire at the same time as that of shore batteries. Machine guns to be manned and fired with the main armament against aircraft visible to the naked eye or illuminated by searchlight.’

The ships maintained a high ready of alertness while in harbour. Standing orders stipulated that half the anti-aircraft armament be manned at all times, rising to full AA manning and half main armament manning at night and dawn.

Mar Grande (Outer Harbour)

The main warship anchorage was in the deeper waters on the eastern side of the Mar Grande close to the major harbour facilities there – including the oil depot, dry dock and floating dock.

A large curved mole named the Diga di Tarantola provided shelter for the large anchorage’s waters. A second mole, the Diga di San Vito combined with a set of submerged breakwaters linking the islets of Isoletto San Paolo and San Pietro in a huge arc to the mainland.

San Pietro was also the site of an acoustic hydrophone station, listening for the approach of submarines or – at night – warships.

While the moles, breakwaters and islands formed a passive barrier to the open sea, a string of 90 barrage balloons were deployed about the battleship anchorage as a deadly obstacle for aircraft. Moorings ran along the eastern edge of the Mar Grande and along the Diga di Tarantola, while rafts attached to the western torpedo net tethered several more. But a storm early in November had ripped many of these balloons from their tethers – leaving just 27 in the air when the British attacked.

The final line of passive defence was a network of torpedo netting intended to shield the valuable battleships as they sat at anchor. It had been calculated some 12.6km of netting was required to fully encompass the warships. Only 4.2km was actively deployed at the time of the raid – with a further 2.9km coiled up ashore awaiting repairs after the same storm that had damaged so many of the defensive balloons.

Within this whole interlaced embrace were the battleship moorings, though some cruisers and destroyers would often be moored about the outer edges.

Mar Piccolo (Inner Harbour)

The main naval shore facility was on the east side of the canal, on the southern edge of Mar Piccolo. The long wharf with its chain of jetties offered a sheltered anchorage for the fleet’s lighter vessels – including cruisers.

On its shore was also a seaplane ramp, with affiliated storage sheds, hangars and administration buildings.

Along with the major warships in the inner harbour were five torpedo boats, 16 submarines, four minesweepers and one minelayer.  Auxiliaries included nine tankers, supply ships and hospital ships along with an assortment of civilian tugs and merchant ships.

Regia Marina

1ST BATTLESHIP SQUADRON

5th Division

Conti di Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Andrea Doria

9th Division

Littorio, Vittorio Veneto, Caio Duilio

2nd CRUISER SQUADRON

1st Division

Pola, Zara, Goriza, Fiume

3rd Division

Trento, Trieste, Bolzano

8th Division

Duca degli Abruzzi, Giuseppe Garibaldi

Seaplane carrier: Giuseppe Mariglia

4th DESTROYER FLOTILLA

Alfredo Oriani, Giosui Carducci, Vincenzo Gioberti, Vittorio Alfieri, Libeccio, Baleno, Lampo, Folgore

OPERATION MIKE BRAVO ATE (MB8)

Just days before the scheduled attack, a serious incident threatened the viability of the whole operation.

At 11am on Friday October 18, an accidental fire erupted in HMS Illustrious’ forward hangar.

There were 30 aircraft tightly packed into the confined space as maintenance crews raced to get all in pristine condition before the raid scheduled for just two days time. This involved fitting large auxiliary fuel tanks in the Swordfish cockpits.

Amid the hustle and bustle, a mechanic slipped. Falling, he also dropped a tool – which sparked. This ignited fumes from the long-range tanks, causing a small explosion. This tore apart the Swordfish he was working on and the flames quickly spread to adjoining aircraft.

The carrier was instantly called to General Fire Stations. The internal ventilation systems were shut down and the fire curtains dropped - confining the blaze to "A" hangar (the forward third of the hangar space).

Illustrious’ crew quickly activated the hangar’s network of fire-suppression sprayers in Hangar A to avert catastrophe. It worked. Just two aircraft would be judged destroyed and three badly damaged by the blaze.

One of Illustrious' squadron duty officers recalled:

... The drainage scuppers at each side of the after entrance lobby to the hangar pouring away a blazing mixture of sea water and petrol with flames four feet high being beaten down by the powerful sprays.

The ship's company was stood down from fire stations at 12:32 But the sprayers used salt water drawn direct from the sea. This meant the aircraft within the hangar had been doused with highly corrosive liquid.

An enormous clean-up and repair effort was required to get as many aircraft as possible back in the air. This involved stripping several planes and engines apart, washing components with fresh water, coating them with protective oil – and reassembling it all again.

Shortly after an order was issued aboard Illustrious that only rubber hammers be used when work was being done on an aircraft's fuel systems.

It was obvious Illustrious would not be ready in time for full moon of Nelson’s celebration. 

At first, an alternate date of October 31 was considered. But it would be a dark, moonless night. This would place too great a reliance on flare droppers. The next available opportunity, with illumination from the moon, would be the night of November 11.

In one way the accidental fire had been fortuitous.

It allowed HMS Illustrious’ movements to be masked by an urgent rush of ships about the Eastern Mediterranean to counter Italy's October 28 invasion of Greece.

NOVEMBER 4:

Cunningham’s first piece on the chess-board of MB8 was Convoy AN6. Three slow merchant ships carrying petrol departed Port Said for Athens, escorted by the AA cruisers HMS Calcutta and Coventry and the destroyers HMS Dainty, HMAS Vampire, Waterhen and Voyager. Their course would take them around the east end of Crete, though they would be within the range of Italian reconnaissance and bombers from Leros and Rhodes for the entire journey.

NOVEMBER 5:

Convoy MW3 sailed from Alexandria, headed for Malta and Crete. This convoy was built around five freighters destined for Valetta and a further three headed to Suda Bay. Escorting them would be the cruisers HMS Ajax and HMAS Sydney. The intention was for MW3 to rendezvous with AN6 on November 6 when some 200 miles north of Alexandria to combine the firepower of their escorts.

NOVEMBER 6:

Cunningham now deployed Force A from Alexandria. In formation were HMS Warspite, Valiant, Malaya and Ramillies in company with the cruisers HMS Gloucester, York and Orion.  Screening them were the destroyers HMS Nubian, Mohawk, Jervis, Janis, Juno, Hyperion, Hasty, Hero, Hereward, Havoc, Ilex, Decoy and Defender.

HMS Illustrious was with them, alone. HMS Eagle had not been able to overcome a series of defects that had slowly become apparent after anear-misses during the Battle of Calabria.  Among them was contamination of her aviation petrol supply by salt water. Most serious, however, were leaks in the petrol distribution network of pipes which threatened a catastrophic explosion.

Lyster's hopes of launching a 30-strong Swordfish strike were dashed.

But Eagle would not go unrepresented.

Six Swordfish and eight crew were transferred to Illustrious to bring her air group back up to maximum strength. Two of Eagle’s requisitioned Sea Gladiators would also take station as a deck park aboard Illustrious to supplement the fighter defence.

 Cunningham set Force A on a north-westerly course at 20 knots. His intention was to catch up with the Malta-bound elements of the earlier convoys on November 8.

NOVEMBER 7:

By now the Italians sensed something was brewing. Reports were streaming in of widely separated – but big - RN formations converging from at least three different directions.

HMS Ark Royal, with the cruiser HMS Sheffield and destroyers Faulkner, Duncan, Firedrake, Forester, Fortune and Fury had departed Gibraltar as Force H and was making its way northeast towards Sardinia.

Force F moved out with them – though it was intended these ships would break through the 90-mile gap between Sicily and Tunisia to join up with Cunningham’s Eastern Mediterranean fleet. Force F comprised the battleship HMS Barham and the destroyers HMS Encounter, Gallant, Greyhound and Griffin. The cruisers HMS Berwick and Glasgow were part of this force, though they - along with Barham - had the added role of ferrying fresh troops to Malta as part of their passage.

The escorts of AN6 and MW3 (Forces B and C) met their rendezvous off Crete to form Force X. With them between Crete and Greece was convoy MW3. Their mutual ultimate destination was the waters off Malta. AN6 was scheduled to arrive at Athen’s port of Pireus before dawn the next day.

Meanwhile, Cunningham’s Force A was continuing on its north-westerly course in waters north of Benghazi.

HMS Illustrious picked up a shadowing Italian aircraft at a range of 25 miles. No radio transmission was detected. No fighter interception was made.

NOVEMBER 8

The Supermarina’s command staff was by now seriously concerned. So, at dawn, an intensive reconnaissance effort was launched from Sardinia in the west and Leros and Rhodes in the east. Aircraft from Sicily protectively scoured the waters between the home peninsula and Libya.

All were tasked with locating and tracking the British fleets.

Cunningham’s Force A had taken up station some 200 miles east of Malta to help screen the movements of Convoy MW3.

At 12:30 Illustrious’ radar operators again reported ‘bogeys’ (unidentified contacts) appearing on their screens at a range of 20 miles. It was an Italian flight of Cant 501 Seagull and 506 Heron seaplanes, scouring the sea from a height of 6000ft. 

Two of Eagle's Sea Gladiators were contributing to Illustrious' standing air patrol. These intercepted and shot down the Cant Z-501 of 186 Squadriglia. Three of its crew were plucked from rough seas by a British Sunderland flying boat.

The approaching Italian aircraft attempted to force their way past the fighters, but all were turned back before they could directly observe the fleet.

An hour later, a similar scenario unfolded near Force H as it passed Algiers: Ark Royal’s fighter direction officers alerted her Fulmars to the arrival of an Italian reconnaissance aircraft which they managed to turn away.

Illustrious would again detect a scout, this time at a distance of 25 miles, about 14:00. Her Fulmars failed to find the Italian.

While nether force had been carefully observed, the Italians nevertheless now knew roughly where the fleet elements were.

At 16:30, Illustrious’ radar screens lit up again. The fleet had 20 minutes in which to respond. Illustrious’ standing air patrol of two Fulmars was vectored to intercept, and a ‘ready’ aircraft on deck scrambled.

The contacts were calculated to be at a height of 12,000 feet. This time it was two formations of SM79s from 34 Stormo totalling 15 aircraft, loaded with bombs for a high-level attack. Two Fulmars of 806 squadron were soon among one of the formations (with seven aircraft) while still 30 miles out from the fleet. One SM79 was claimed shot down and the others were forced to jettison their bombs in their efforts to evade. None made it over the fleet.

Another flight of three bombers was detected at 17:00: Fulmars gave chase, but were unable to overhaul the retreating aircraft.

An hour later, HMS Ark Royal's radar operators detected another approaching aircraft. The official after-action report (ADM 199/798) report the shooting down of an S-79:

At 1800, 808 Squadron, Blue Section, was about to land and had lowered their hooks when an aircraft was sighted on the starboard beam and they were sent off after it, and shot it down. The combat report of the section leader is attached. The last aircraft were landed on at 1900.

As the Italians strove to probe the RN’s defences and intentions, Force H separated from Force F and headed towards the Italian islands of Sardinia for Operation Crack.

To the east, the cruisers of Force X would merge with Force A and together the warships covered Convoy MW3’s journey towards Malta.

NOVEMBER 9

By now the Supermarina had a pretty good idea what number – and type – of ships the RN had active.

There were far too many warships to simply be covering a handful of freighters as they moved westwards towards Malta.

So what was Cunningham up to?

Again, the order of the day was for as many reconnaissance aircraft to get into the air as soon as possible. Once positions were pinned down, follow-up high-level bomber strikes would be launched.

OPERATION COAT

Meanwhile, HMS Ark Royal was flying off its own dawn attack. Nine Swordfish from 810, 818 and 820 squadrons were sent to bomb the Italian Cagliari airbase in Operation Crack.

About the same time, three of 808 Squadron's Fulmars were sent into the air - destination Malta. Their orders were to refuel before flying on to reinforce HMS Illustrious' defences.

No Swordfish were lost in the raid, which did substantial damage to the airfield’s hangars and several of the reconnaissance aircraft there. A Cant 506b shadowed the Swordfish back to the fleet, but it was shot down by Ark Royal’s Fulmar CAP at 0950.

It was cause for retaliation.

OPERATION MB8

The persistence of the Italian reconnaissance wing was again evident. HMS Illustrious located a flight of three aircraft at 09:00, though these did not linger long enough for an interception.

At 11:00 a shadower was reported by both radar and radio operators: This time Force A’s position had been broadcast in an accurate and timely manner.

But Cunningham had just split his fleet into three new task groups.

HMS Ramillies and three destroyers would accompany MW3 into Valetta.

The cruisers HMS York, Gloucester, Calcutta and Coventry were to aggressively sweep north of Malta in search of Italian shipping.

The remainder of Force A – HMS Illustrious, three battleships and 14 destroyers – would continue northwest towards the Sicilian Narrows to meet Force F.

The Italians were overwhelmed by piecemeal and conflicting reports.

Another Italian aircraft attempted to shadow Force A at 16:00. Illustrious’ Fulmars were directed to a successful intercept, and the Cant Z-506 from 170 Squadriglia was shot down as it attempted to evade in cloud.

But HMS Illustrious was to mysteriously lose a Swordfish. The aircraft suffered engine failure shortly after take-off and was forced to ditch. The two crew members were quickly pulled from the water by HMS Nubian, but there was little indication as to what the problem had been.

Having sailed with just 24 Swordfish aboard, the loss of even one represented a not insignificant portion of the total available strike force.

Then, later that same afternoon, a second Swordfish crashed after engine failure.

NOVEMBER 10

With Force F safely through the Narrows, the three extra destroyers Somerville had sent to act as minesweepers came about and raced to rejoin Force H as it made its way back towards Gibraltar. 

Force F merged with Cunningham’s Force A without incident. HMS Berwick and Glasgow, however, separated: they had to deliver their troops to Malta.

Things could have been worse for the convoy now entering Grand Harbour, Malta: The Italian submarine Capponi had loosed three torpedoes at HMS Ramillies. All missed.

An Italian Cant Z-501 reconnaissance aircraft of 144 Squadriglia (based at Stagnone) encountered Force A about noon. It was detected when 20 miles out, and the CAP Fulmars shot it down at 1220.

However the Italians now had enough information to attempt another attack. Radar detected a formation of 9 bombers when still 65 miles away. The Fulmars were waiting as they approached within 25 miles. This time most of the Italians managed to break through, though one was shot down. Seven were able to make bombing runs on the fleet, with HMS Valiant suffering several near misses when she was straddled by bombs.

Several empty freighters in Valetta were redesignated ME3 for their return journey to Alexandria. In the afternoon they left Grand Harbour for Suda Bay, with HMS Ramillies, Ajax and HMAS Sydney – along with a small group of destroyers – in company. After a short spring south, the convoy began to make its way eastward.

Force A was now sailing on an east-northeast course, placing it between the convoy and the Italian mainland.

A Swordfish, piloted by Charles Lamb, was flown to Malta to pick up the latest reconnaissance prints from Taranto. He was told to wait until the morning, by when the most recent batch of film could be fully processed.

HMS Illustrious, however, had serious cause for concern.

A third Swordfish had fallen into the sea.

All three aircraft had been from 819 Squadron. All of the remaining aircraft were ordered to drain their fuel tanks. It was found to be contaminated with water, sand and fungus. The fuel had been transferred from the tanker Toneline in Alexandria into just one of Illustrious’ fuel storage tanks. Fortunately there was adequate stocks remaining in the remaining tanks to keep all her air group flying.

But would just 21 Swordfish be enough?

At noon a group, designated Force X and commanded by Admiral Pridham-Wippell, was formed from the cruisers HMAS Sydney, HMS Orion and HMS Ajax along with the destroyers Mohawk and Nubian. This force would run ahead and to the left of the track HMS Illustrious would take later the same day as the carrier made its way toward Taranto.

The intention was for these cruisers and destroyers to be sighted first and act as a ‘magnet’ for any follow-up reconnaissance efforts. If not detected, they would pass through the narrow Straits of Otranto and into the Adriatic Sea in search of targets of opportunity – again as a diversion.

At 18:00 hours, HMS Illustrious was detached along with a screen including the cruisers Berwick, York, Glasgow and Gloucester and four destroyers. This would simply be designated “Strike Force”.  She was scheduled to reach her flying-off point – designated Point X - some 40 nautical miles west-southwest of the island of Cephalonia and 170 nautical miles from Taranto at 20:00.

As the carrier and her escorts pulled away from Force A, Admiral Cunningham signalled Rear Admiral Lyster:

OPERATION JUDGEMENT

As dusk fell, an RAF Sunderland passed near Taranto for a final look. It reported the five Italian battleships were still anchored - and that they had even been joined by a sixth.

It was an ideal opportunity.

The final version of the attack plan called for two waves of attacks by Swordfish separated by one hour.

Every pilot had been briefed on the location of ships, defences and obstacles. The best likely corridors of approach had been determined, but it would be up to each pilot to choose the most suitable course for their given mission.

FIRST WAVE

Torpedo bombers: (1x 18in Mk XII torpedo)

• L4A: Lt. Cdr. Pilot K. Williamson, Observer Lt. N. Scarlett, 815 Squadron

• L4C: S/Lt P.D. Sparkle, S/Lt A. L. Neale, 815 Squadron

• L4R: S/Lt A. Macaulay, S/Lt A. Wray, 815 Squadron

• L4K: Lt N. Kemp, Lt G.W. Bailey, 815 Squadron

• L4M: Lt H. Swayne, S/Lt J. Buscall, 815 Squadron

• E4F: Lt M. Maund, S/Lt W. Bull, 813 Squadron

Bombers: (6x 250lb bombs)

• L4L: S/Lt W. C. Sarra, Mid. J. Barker, 815 Squadron

• L4H: S/Lt A. Forde, S/Lt A Mardel-Ferreira, 815 Squadron

• E5A: Capt O. Patch RM, Lt. D. Goodwin, 824 Squadron

• E5Q: Lt J. Murray, S/LT S. Paine, 824 Squadron

Flare/bombers: (16x flares, 4 250lb bombs)

• L4P: Lt L. J. Kiggell, Lt. H. Janvrin, 815 Squadron

• L5B: Lt. C. Lamb, Lt. K. Grieve, 819 Squadron

It was hoped the first wave would have a measure of the element of surprise. For this reason, with Illustrious’ now diminished Swordfish group, it would be the stronger force. Twelve aircraft would take part – 10 from Illustrious and 2 from Eagle. Half would carry torpedoes; two would carry a mix of four 250lb bombs and 16 parachute flares, while the remainder would heft six bombs.

The flares were to be dropped in an oblique line to the south-east, opposite the torpedo-carriers lines of approach across the Mar Grande. This was to both provide a diversion, as well as present the anchored ships as clearly defined silhouettes. Once their flares were exhausted, they were to drop their bombs on the harbours’ oil storage facilities.

The dedicated bombers were to hit the cruisers and destroyers lined up in the Mar Piccolo, as well as the adjoining seaplane base. Shallow dives were considered all that was needed: there were barrage balloons about, after all.

FIRST WAVE: ARRIVAL

Why Taranto's defences were already blazing away into the sky even before the Swordfish arrived is the subject of much disagreement. Possibly because the harbour sounded three air-raid warning in the lead up to the attack.

The first was about 20:00 when a diaphone (sound detector) picked up distant engines. Alarms sounded and Taranto's citizens went to their shelters. A few shots were fired into the air at random - and 10 minutes later the all clear was sounded.

An hour later the sirens went off again, this time likely due to the high-flying 228 Squadron RAF Sunderland having one last look at the harbour. Italy had no night fighters to respond with.

Some accounts also blame this aircraft for the third Taranto alarm at 22.50.  But the Swordfish pilots themselves believe it was Ian Swain in the Swordfish L4M that had become separated earlier. Believing he had fallen behind the main force, he sped up – arriving a full 15 to 25 minutes ahead of the main body.

Charles Lamb, the pilot aboard L5B, recalled:

Almost as soon as we were airborne we had to climb through heavy cumulus cloud, and when we emerged into the moonlight at 7,500 feet only nine of the twelve aircrafts’ lights were in sight. When the others were unable to find their leader they flew direct to Taranto. One of them was Ian Swayne, who flew at sea level and reached the target area fifteen minutes before anyone else. He had no wish to be the first uninvited guest of the Italian Navy in Taranto, and for a quarter of an hour he flew to and fro, keeping the harbour in sight waiting for the main strike. There was nothing else he could do but, of course, his presence had been detected by the Italian listening devices, and as a result all the harbour defences and the ships had been alerted… For the last 15 minutes of our passage across the Ionian Sea Scarlett had no navigational problems, for Taranto could be seen from a distance of 50 miles or more, because of the welcome awaiting us. The sky over the harbour looked as it sometimes does over Mount Etna, in Sicily, when the great volcano erupts. The darkness was being torn apart by a firework display which spat flame into the night to a height of nearly 5,000 feet. “They don’t seem very pleased to see us,” said Grieve. As he spoke “Blood” Scarlett’s dimmed Aldis light flashed the breakaway signal to Kiggell and me, telling us to start adding to the illuminations over the crowded harbour.’

Charles Lamb, in his flare deploying role, described himself thus: “For an unforgettable half-hour I had a bird’s eye view of history in the making”. He went on to paint the opening moments of the battle:

Before the first Swordfish had dived to the attack, the full-throated roar from the guns of six battleships and the blast from the cruisers and destroyers made the harbour defences seem like a side-show... From my position astern of Kiggell and Janvrin I was in no danger whatever and could watch proceedings at leisure. I have never been in less danger in any attack than I was that night, when the rest of the squadron were flying into the jaws of hell. I was convinced that none of the torpedoing aircraft could have survived.

From his vantage point Baily (L4K) reported seeing gunfire from the cruisers – aimed at the low flying Swordfish below – hitting nearby merchant vessels. The Italians realised their error, and began aiming a little higher. The Swordfish were therefore able to approach under this umbrella of fire.

Soon the shape of the battleship Littorio suddenly loomed out against the backdrop of flares and tracer fire. Making a hard turn to port, L4M dropped its torpedo at just 400 yards. Swayne was forced to heave his Swordfish between Littorio’s masts. It was a good shot. The torpedo detonated against Littorio’s port side.

Almost the same time, a second torpedo exploded on her starboard bow. This had been dropped by L4K (Kemp) which had entered Mar Grand from even further north – following the coast to the inner harbour, swinging south before loosing at Littorio. Kemp would, like several other pilots, report shells from nearby cruisers passing over his head before falling among merchants on the opposite side of the harbour.

E4F (Eagle’s Maund and Bull) had been following L4K. Dropping its torpedo in almost the same place, this weapon missed Littorio but tracked Vittorio Veneto – until it struck the bottom and buried itself in the mud. Banking hard to starboard to avoid two cruisers, Maund instead found himself flying at cockpit-level with the anti-aircraft guns of the destroyer Gioberti. They did not fire. Zigzagging madly, Maund eventually reached the open sea:

Bull, ‘My Christ, Bull! Just look at that bloody awful mess! Just look at it!’

All but L4A safely made it back out of the harbour.

FIRST WAVE: BOMB ATTACK

Meanwhile, E5A, E5Q and L4H had been choosing from a wealth of targets in the crowded Mar Piccolo, the tank farm and the seaplane base.

E5A was following the flare droppers by just a few minutes. Circling above the exploding barrage fire from 8500ft and crossing the harbour to the south-east, E5A eventually spotted the heavy cruisers Trieste and Bolzano.  The pilot, Patch, kicked his bomber into a dive – released his bombs (one of which had a Royal Marine boot strapped to it) – and was forced to dodge behind a hill and weave close among the rooftops of Taranto itself to evade an intense barrage of following gunfire.

The captains of the three heavy cruisers – Trento, Trieste and Bolzano – soon realised their ships were lost among the gloom of the central harbour. They ceased fire and let the darkness shield them.

L4L (Sarra and Bowker) had flown in to Mar Grande from over Cape Rondinella at about 8000ft before diving to 1500ft – tracked all the way by defensive gunfire. Unable to spot their primary target – the cruisers – amid the maelstrom, L4L instead singled out the seaplane base. All of the Swordfish’s load of 250lbs bomb exploded among the hangars, storehouses and slipway. Two seaplanes were destroyed.

L4H (Forde and Mardel-Ferreira) had lost contact with its sub-flight during the approach to Taranto, but had attached itself to Williamson’s torpedo bombers. As the torpedo bombers swept downwards, Forde passed directly over the battleship anchorage on his way to Mar Piccolo. Dropping to 1500ft for better visibility, he failed to see the heavy cruisers. So he dropped his six bombs in the tightly-packed vicinity of what appeared to be two light cruisers and several destroyers. Uncertain his bombs had released, Forde made a second pass – and emerged from the firestorm unscathed.

First bomb fell in water short of the two 8-inch cruisers. During the dive intense AA fire was suffered. The pilot was not sure that his bombs had dropped, so turned round in the western part of the Mar Piccolo and repeated the attack.

The last bombs dropped were by E5Q (Murray and Paine). They had followed behind L4H, and also could not see the heavy cruisers at their moorings. So they also dropped on the line of moored ships while flying steadily at 3000ft. One punched through the destroyer Libeccio, but, like most of the other bombs dropped that night, was observed not to explode.

SECOND WAVE

Torpedo bombers: (1x 18in Mk XII torpedo)

• L5A: Pilot Lt Cdr. J.D. Hale, Observer Lt. G.A. Carline, 819 Squadron

• L5H: Lt C. Lea, S/Lt P.D. Jones, 819 Squadron

• L5K: Lt F. Torrens-Spence, Lt. A. Sutton, 819 Squadron

• E4H: Lt. G. Gayley, Lt. H. Slaughter, 813 Squadron

• E5H: Lt. J. Wellham, Lt. P. Humprehys, 824 Squadron

Bombers: (6x 250lb bombs)

• L5F: Lt. E. W. Clifford, Lt. G. R. Going, 819 Squadron

• L5Q: Lt. A. Morford, S/Lt. M. Greene, 819 Squadron

Flare/bombers: (16x flares, 4 250lb bombs)

• E5B: Lt. R. Hamilton, S/Lt. J. Weeks, 819 Squadron

• L4F: Lt. R. Skelton, S/Lt E. A. Perkins, 815 Squadron

As the first wave made its way towards Taranto, Illustrious slowed to 17 knots and began a 30-mile circle to bring the carrier back to the launch position, Point X, in time for the second wave.

All aircraft were on deck by 21:00: Fitters swarming over them to conduct final checks and the aircrews making sure everything was in order.

Nine Swordfish made up the second attack force. It was scheduled to arrive an hour after the first, and hopefully 20 minutes after that attack had been completed. Five would carry torpedoes. Their pilots were told to attack whichever battleship presented the best target at the time in order to avoid the confusion that almost inevitably eventuated with finding individual ships at night. The bombers had the same orders as the first wave – go for the smaller ships in Mar Piccolo and the seaplane sheds. The flare droppers could go after targets of opportunity.

SECOND WAVE: LAUNCH

The Swordfish prepared to fly off at 21.23. Illustrious had again turned into the wind.

Seven aircraft had leapt into the air before disaster struck.

L5F  (Clifford and Going) began to move forward for its take-off run. But the ninth – and final – aircraft behind, L5Q (Morford and Greene), had its chocks prematurely removed. It began to roll forward – and its wings tangled with those of L5F. Both engines were cut as the deck handlers raced to separate the machines – but L5F’s fabric covering its wing and fuselage had been torn. L5Q, however, was undamaged.

Captain Boyd and Commander Robertson were informed: It was resolved to fly off L5F immediately. 

Clifford and Going were adamant L5F be repaired immediately. The Swordfish was struck below, returning to deck in just 25 minutes.

L5Q joined flight leader Hale and the other Swordfish in their holding pattern five miles ahead of the carrier at 21:45. Illustrious signalled “Carry On”.

All eight turned towards Taranto - well aware they would be flying into a hornet’s nest already stirred to anger.

Twenty minutes later, a metal strap holding the external fuel tank to L5Q (Morford and Green) failed.  (L5Q was in bomber configuration, so the tank was between the wheels). Whether or not this was a result of the earlier deck accident, it began banging against the fuselage before falling off.

The engine cut – it had been fed from the external tank. Morford only managed to get it re-started after drop of 1000ft. L5Q turned back to HMS Illustrious which was not expecting such an early return. Tense gunners aboard Illustrious and Berwick opened fire (with no greater accuracy than the Italians) until the correct identification lights were shown.

Just seven Swordfish remained in the second wave.

Hale opened his throttle to make up for lost time.

L5F(Clifford and Going) caught up with the main body of the second wave shortly before they began their attack runs.

It was 23:10 when the second wave sighted Taranto from 8000ft while still 60 miles away. Taranto sat under a giant green cone of tracer, twinkling with flak bursts.

At 23:50, the Swordfish were ordered to begin their approach.

SECOND WAVE: FLARES

The flare-droppers again moved in slightly ahead. L5B (Hamilton and Weekes) and L4F (Skelton and Perkins) crossed over Cape San Vito, passing between the battleships and the moon. They met little opposition – though their flares once again drew heavy fire. Both would drop their bombs on the oil installation from 2500ft before turning for Illustrious.

SECOND WAVE: TORPEDO ATTACK

The five torpedo-carriers crossed north of Capte Rondinella shortly after 0:10, avoiding the guns on San Pietro island. They swooped over the merchant ship anchorage, drawing an intense barrage of light artillery.

L5A (Hale and Carline), L5H (Lea and Jones) headed towards Littorio. E4H (Bayley and Slaughter) appeared to branch off to attack Andrea Doria or Vittorio Veneto. Suddenly, E4H lurched to starboard and crossed in front of the other two Swordfish before exploding and crashing into the harbour between the heavy cruiser Goriza and the destroyer Gioberti. It is thought the stricken E4H may have tried to drop its torpedo on Goriza as one was found floating nearby – its warhead crushed from impact. Both crew perished.

L5A (Hale) led L5K (Torrens-Spence) around the northern end of a line of balloons and dropped down inside the torpedo nets. Both torpedoes hit the water just 700ft from Littorio. One hit the battleship’s starboard bow. The second was later found stuck in the mud – its Duplex pistol having failed. The time was logged as 00:01.

L5K (Torrens-Spence and Sutton) had had to evade the burning Swordfish (E4H) as it plunged into the water. The harbour was a cauldron of flame and tracer. Torrens-Spence would recall:

The flash of her close range weapons stabbed at us, as first one and then another along her length opened up… We were in the centre of an incredible mass of crossfire from the cruisers and battleships and shore batteries.

Spotting Littorio at a less than perfect 45 degree angle, Torrens-Spence attempted to loose L5K’s torpedo regardless as he felt he had no chance of surviving any attempt to  circle his Swordfish into a better attack position. It jammed. With his Stringbag dragging its wheels in the water, it finally released. It isn’t certain which torpedo – that of L5A (Hale) or L5K (Torrens-Spence) – actually hit.

Torrens-Spence, flying as low as possible to evade the flak, recalled flying directly into a pair of floating gun batteries:

‘All the enemy close-range weapons had opened fire. We could see multiple batteries by the entrance to the inner harbour pouring stuff out right next to our dropping position – tracer, and incendiaries, and horrible things called flaming onions.

Meanwhile, L5H (Lea and Jones), had passed over Cape Rondinella before peeling off towards the battleship Duilio. Their torpedo, dropped from just 600 yards, struck alongside B turret on the starboard side. L5H made its escape, weaving past the heavy cruisers Fiume and Zara, untouched.

E5H (Wellham) had also crossed Cape Rondinella at about 8000ft but lost sight of his leader, Hale, as he dove through the flak. Choosing to dive into what appeared to be a ‘hole’ in the anti-aircraft fire, E5H then suddenly struck a drifting barrage balloon – somehow cut loose during the battle. Tumbling towards Taranto city, Wellham managed to regain control – fighting to deliver his valuable torpedo in a meaningful manner. Vittorio Veneto loomed to his right. The battleship had also spotted the Swordfish. The Italian flagship opened up with everything she had as E5H was yanked into a 180-degree turn with one wing dragging in the water. The torpedo was loosed and Wellham did a sharply climbing turn to starboard. It missed – but may have continued on to strike Cavour. E5H was then hit by an exploding shell in the lower port wing, breaking wooden ribs and tearing a hole in the fabric. But the Swordfish continued to fly.

All the surviving Swordfish were now well on their way back to Illustrious.

Then arrived L5F.

SECOND WAVE: BOMB ATTACK

Going had pleaded with Captain Boyd and Commander Robertson to allow them to follow the second wave. All the while, Clifford had been supervising the repairs and insisted the Swordfish again be ranged on deck.

L5F had flown off just 24 minutes behind the main body – its Pegasus engine racing to catch up. Either way, both Clifford and Going knew they would arrive over the heavily defended harbour alone. Ahead, Going saw the maelstrom that awaited them.

‘It was the biggest firework display we had ever seen, and we were awestruck by it.’

Diving into Mar Piccolo – just as the flares began to stutter out – Clifford spotted the darkened cluster of heavy cruisers by the glow of the burning seaplane base. Dropping from 2500ft to 500ft, L5F released its bombs. None were seen to explode, but one had in fact hit the cruiser Trento, rupturing its forward oil tank.

The time was 0:35. L5F, the last Swordfish over Taranto, successfully passed out of the firestorm.

Illustrious and her consorts turned south and began the race for safety that distance entailed.

For the pilots and crew, it was time debriefing - followed by an early breakfast of whiskey and eggs, and a piece of pink-iced cake in the shape of a Swordfish.

NIGHT ACTION

As the Swordfish flew towards Taranto in the night of November 11, the darkened cruisers of Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippell clustered closed together in an effort to slip through the straits of Otranto and into the Adriatic Sea.

HMS Orion, Ajax and HMAS Sydney, with the Tribal class destroyers Nubian and Mohawk, were moving at high speed in the bright moonlight to intercept what they knew to be a regular convoy movement between Valona, Brindisi and Bari.

Force X slipped past the south-west of the island of Corfu at 20:30 while travelling at 25 knots. The sea was calm. The wind was a steady force 1. The sky was about 7-10ths' cloud.

The exact same conditions the Swordfish were experiencing.

Time was limited: the cruisers had to race back south to the safety of Cunningham's main fleet before retaliatory air and sea forces could find them.

So, when it reached its designated northernmost point at 0100 on the morning of the 12th, about when the Swordfish were begining to land back on Illustrious, Force X had to turn around.

It was 01:15 when HMS Mohawk sighted darkened ships at about 8 miles distance. It was a convoy of four ships escorted by the torpedo boat Nicola Fabrizi and the auxiliary Ramb II.

Mohawk and Nubian charged the enemy at 25kts, opening fire on Fabrizi at 01:25 when at a range of 4000 yeards. The torpedo boat was quickly hit, and turned away behind smoke.

HMS Orion had by this time also sighted the convoy. Pridham-Wippell's flagship opened fire on the third cargo ship in line at 0128, while the 4in secondary mounts initiated rapid-fire against the torpedo boat.

Starshell from the other two cruisers quickly illuminated the scene.

The merchant ship was hit repeatedly and sank when hit by one of two torpedoes fired at her.

Orion shifted target to the fourth ship in line which was also hit repeatedly. Her crew abandoned ship before her back was broken by a torpedo.

The second cruiser in line, HMS Ajax, engaged the torpedo boat five minutes after the action began. But the Italian soon slipped out of range. Ajax shifted fire to the two remaining merchant ships.

HMAS Sydney, the last ship in the line, had spotted the Italian ships at 01:21 and opened fire on the lead merchant. Once that ship was seen to be alight, Sydney also fired on the second cargo ship. The hapless Italian torpedo boat also drew several salvos in the short time it was in range.

Sydney had the closest call of the evening: a torpedo passed directly under the Australian cruiser without exploding. Sydney loosed two of her own torpedoes at the Italian merchants.

With the cargo vessels either sunk or well alight by 01:53, Pridham-Wippell ordered his ships to disengage. Course was set to return south at 28 knots.

All four merchant ships had been sunk: Catalani (2429 tons), Capo Vado (4391 tons), Premuda (4427 tons) and Antinio Locatelli (5491 tons).

The torpedo boat Nicola Fabrizi was badly holed but managed to limp into harbour. The armed auxiliary Ramb III escaped unharmed.

NOVEMBER 12

While Malta's RAF reconnaissance aircraft had overflown Taranto early on the morning of the 12th, the results were not passed on to Admiral Lyster and his anxious captain and aircrew.

The pilots' reports were confused. Had the raid been a success?

Admiral Lyster resolved to keep Illustrious in range for a second sprint towards Taranto, and a follow-up strike, that night.

Accounts of this decision are contradictory. Lamb reports the FAA pilots and aircrew were despondent at this - considering it a certain death warrant: "They only asked the Light Brigade to do it once!". Admiral Lyster said it was his aircrew's exuberance that compelled him to consider a second attack to be viable 

The cruisers of Force X, under Admiral Pridham-Wippell, rejoined the fleet shortly before noon. Enthusiastic messages were exchanged by signal lamp detailing their attack on the convoy.

Three  flying boats sought out HMS Illustrious to deal a measure of revenge. All three were quickly downed by her protective Fulmars. The first  Z501 was tracked at 5000ft. Fulmars intercepted at 1155 and shot it down in flames. At 1205 the second was engaged, meeting the same fate. The third, this time a 506b, was engaged at 7000ft and fell after two passes.

One of the flying boats hit the water alongside HMS Warspite - much to the appreciation of Admiral Cunning ham. But even as the attacking Italians were being splashed, heavy winds and dark clouds began to loom on the horizon.

The repeat attack was cancelled.

Radio messages began to confirm the success of the first raid. First at 2031 and again at 2345, details of the damage to Italian battleships finally filtered through.

Admiral Cunningham flashed his message to Illustrious:

Maneuvre well executed

OUTCOMES

Recriminations withinin Italian high-command were intense.  The Regia Aeronautica had promised no Royal Naval ship would ever be able to approach within 180 miles without being sighted. Illustrious had launched her Swordfish 170 miles from Taranto.

Commander Bragadin would write:

At Supermarina it was taken for granted that if British forces should come within 180 miles operating range of their torpedo planes from Taranto, the Italian forces would sortie to engage the British and prevent them launching an air attack on the harbour. The events of the night of 12 November, added to many other lessons, confirmed in the most obvious way the deficiencies of Italian air reconnaissance. The fact was that large groups of enemy ships had been cruising the whole preceeding day in the central Mediterranean and, at sundown, had crossed the Ionian and Adriatic Seas; yet the Italian reconnaissance had not given the slightest warning of their presence.

An effective air-exclusion zone would have had to reach out more than 360 miles. Nevertheless, it was in large part due to HMS Illustrious' Fulmar fighter and fighter direction officers that surprise was achieved. Reconnaissance aircraft were regularly being shot down before they could make their reports. That the Italians did not wonder why their aircraft were not returning or being driven off remains their primary failing. 

LITTORIO

From follow-up reconnaissance photographs, the damage to Littorio looked dramatic. She was down by the bows with her forecastle awash. Oil was billowing out into the harbour.

She had two auxiliaries and a tanker tied up alongside, along with a submarine. The tanker was urgently attempting to lighten the stricken battleship by taking off oil while the submarine provided emergency electrical power to her pumps.

But the three torpedoes that had struck her had failed to inflict critical damage.

The hit from L4K (Niel Kemp) on the starboard side had blown out a 49 by 32ft hole inside the anti-torpedo bulge alongside No.1 6in turret. It penetrated both the hull and the inner torpedo bulkhead, producing extensive flooding.

The second hit (from Swayne in L4M) had punched a 23 by 5ft hole in the port side alongside the tiller flat. This wrecked the port rudder and put the battleship’s whole steering mechanism out of action. Flooding was confined to just two watertight comparments.

The third hit, during the second strike (from Torrens-Spence in L5K/C) had struck low on the starboard side further forward than the first torpedo. It blew open a hole 40 by 30ft under Aturret, at the bottom edge of its bulge. This also caused heavy flooding.

A fourth torpedo was later found in the mud. There was a dent in Littorio’s starboard stern quarter above it. Defusing this torpedo delayed salvage operations on Littorio for a month. It was not until December 11 that she began her journey to dry dock.

Despite the extensive damage, Littorio’s wounds were repaired by the end of March.

CONTI DI CAVOUR

The crew of Cavour struggled desperately to keep their old, but heavily updated, battleship afloat. But, by 05.45, she had to be towed inshore and grounded where she was abandoned.

L4A’s torpedo (Williamson) had blasted a 40 by 27ft hole under A turret on the port side. Two oil tanks were opened to the sea and the inner hull behind them breached – compromising the integrity of two watertight compartments. Fighting the flooding of these spaces was the main challenge Cavour’s crew faced.

The blast was against part of Cavour’s armoured citadel, but did not penetrate to the forward magazines.  All electrical power was cut and the battleship began to settle by the bows.

Cavour’s captain urgently called for a tow to get the ship beached before it sank further. After being abandoned at 5.45am, Cavour settled on the bottom with most of her deck under water.

She was not re-floated until July. Her main guns and large chunks of her armour had to be removed to lighten ship. She was then towed to Trieste.

Cavour would never return to service.

DUILIO

L5H’s torpedo (Lea) had blown a 36 by 23ft hole low down between Duilio’s Number 1 and 2 magazines on the starboard side. The crew quickly flooded both to prevent an explosion.

Duilio’s crew worked through the morning to largely contain flooding  to the directly affected watertight compartments, preventing water from spreading through the ship.

But Duilio’s captain, fearing losing the battle against the onrushing water,  managed to get his ship under way. With the aid of a water tanker and two tugs, he had her beached to reduce the risk of sinking.

She would later have a patch placed over her wound, be re-floated in January and towed to Genoa.

Repairs were completed by the end of May.

BOMBING ATTACKS

Despite the best efforts of the Swordfish bomber attacks, they were let down by their 250lb semi-armour piercing bombs.

Despite being fused nose and tail, few of the 42 bombs dropped appear to have detonated.

Post-battle reconnaissance photos revealed quantities of fuel oil spilling into the harbour. But no ship seemed significantly damaged.

Italian records show the destroyer Librecio was hit by an unexploded bomb dropped by E5Q (Murray).  L5F (Clifford) managed to hit the destroyer Passagno and the cruiser Trento with his bombs. These also failed to explode.

The cruiser Trento, however, was left with a large hole in her main deck with torn bulkheads and ventilation trunking. Libeccio’s bow structure was fractured and needed structural reinforcement.

Seaplane Facility: The most successful bombing run was by L4L (Sarra) on the seaplane hangars and slipway. All six bombs fell on their target, igniting large fires and demolishing the hangars. Two aircraft were destroyed. While not a knockout blow, it was nevertheless significant damage.

Oil Tanks: While several bombs did strike home and set fires, the damage was not significant. The SAP weapons appear to have largely passed through the tanks and pipes – igniting the fuel after it had spilled. One the leaks were sealed the flames could be doused. Damage to the infrastructure itself was slight.

OF THINGS TO COME

That Taranto had an influence of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there can be no doubt.

It may not have been the inspiration. There is evidence of Yamamoto contemplating the move up to a year earlier, and he observed training exercises of his navy's torpedo bombers in April and May of 1940.

But it was a demonstration of the soundness of the tactic that cemented Japan’s resolve.

There is no doubt of Yamomoto’s interest in Taranto. He ordered reports on the attack from his attache in Berlin and tactical air chief Minoru Genda in London.

Lieutenant Commander Naito was quickly sent from Berlin to Italy with orders to report what he could find about the British attack plan. This was submitted direct to Admiral Yamamoto. Upon Naito’s return to Japan, he provided a personal briefing on what he had found to Commander Fuchida – the pilot who would lead the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In May 1941 a Japanese delegation visited Italy. They inspected Littorio which had just completed its repairs and interviewed many eyewitnesses to the Taranto attack.

But the Japanese were not the only ones to learn from Taranto.

So, too, did  Lieutenant Commander John N. Opie III, USN.

Opie had observed every phase of the operation, from preparations in the hangar to the briefing of the pilots before the attack. He was there again as they landed, in the debriefing room and in the wardroom as the exhausted crew knocked back their whiskeys.

He wrote a four page summary of his own observations, and attached Captain Boyd's own 12-page report. Opie wrote under headings of training, material used, instructions, results, enemy opposition, carrier night operations and lesson's learnt. 

He detailed five main points:

1. That AA fire was noneffective, except psychologically

2. That attackers should fly low to discourage AA from firing due to fear of hitting friends

3. That the mental strain on attacking pilots was very great

4. That ships may be safer at sea than in harbor, especially on moonlit nights

5. That the RN had abandoned the concept of high-level bombing against ships

He even expressed his desire to travel to Hawaii and discuss the implications of harbour defence with 'the boys there'. This never happened.

Opie's written reports, including one on the bombing of HMS Illustrious a month after Taranto, were widely circulated throughout the USN. Copies were sent to Admirals King, commanding the Atlantic, and Kimmel, commander in the Pacific.

But it may have came too late: Admiral Richardson, who had reported his desire to withdraw the Pacific Fleet from Pearl due to concerns over logistics, was told he would be relieved of his command on January 5. One of his final acts was to endorse a report on the inadequate defences of Pearl Harbor and forward it to Washington.

Like Opies observations, it was largely ignored. 

LIES, DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS

The true – and often overlooked – extent of Operation Judgement’s success can be demonstrated through a simple direct comparison with events that unfolded fractionally more than one year later.

The Day of Infamy was of much larger scale than Taranto. Where the RN was able to deploy just one carrier, Japan sent six.

In terms of scale, the Japanese attack was vastly superior.

But, in terms of efficiency, the Fleet Air Arm came out on top.

HMS Illustrious sortied 21 aircraft against Taranto. Admiral Nagumo launched 355 against Hawaii.

The Fleet Air Arm used one aircraft type – the Fairy Swordfish TSR. The Imperial Japanese Navy put Zero fighters, Val dive bombers and Kate torpedo bombers into action.

The Royal Navy flew at night. The Imperial Navy waited for dawn.

Nagumo launched his strike against unprepared, surprised defenders. Cunningham's aircrew went up against an actively defended, fully-alert facility.

The Italians lost one battleship with a further two severely damaged. A destroyer and heavy cruiser were lightly damaged. Two seaplanes and their hangars were destroyed on the ground.

Italian casualties amounted to 30 dead.

Altogether the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour had destroyed three and severely damaged four battleships and three destroyers. Many aircraft had also been destroyed. 

The casualties were much higher: In just two hours the US Navy had lost 2000 killed and 710 wounded.

The cost to the Royal Navy was two aircraft. Japan lost 29 aircraft. Six submarines were sunk in related actions.

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